In the recent UDRP case of X6D Limited v. Telepathy, Inc. (WIPO Case No. D2010-1519, November 16, 2010) a three member Panel was faced with a dispute over the domain www.xpand.com. Complainant is a supplier of 3D solutions for movie theaters and home use and maintains a website at www.xpandcinema.com. Complainant owns a trademark registration for the mark XPAND BEYOND CINEMA and has pending applications for the single word mark XPAND. The disputed domain was registered on June 25, 2003, which was 3 years prior to the alleged date of first use of the marks by Complainant.

Under paragraph 4(a) of the Policy, the Complainant must prove that each of the following three elements is present: (i) the disputed domain name is identical or confusingly similar to the Complainant’s trademark; and (ii) the Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the disputed domain name; and (iii) the disputed domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.

The Panel found that Complainant established the first prong, since the essence of the registred mark was incorporated into the domain. In addressing the second prong the Panel noted that Respondent alleged the domain was generic or at least descriptive. The Panel found that the word “xpand” was descriptive as a short hand for the word “expand.” The Panel recognized the commercial value of descriptive words, which when such domains are offered for sale can be considered a bona fide offering of goods or services.

The case ultimately seemed to weigh heavily on the third prong, wherein the Panel explained:

The Respondent acquired the disputed domain name in 2003. The Complainant did not use the XpanD Mark until September 2006, more than three years after the Respondent registered the disputed domain name. The Complainant did not provide any explanation as to how the Respondent could possibly have been aware of the Complainant and the Complainant’s mark when registering the disputed domain name.

After making a finding that Complainant failed to prove all three elements, the Panel moved its attention to Respondent’s request for a finding of Reverse Domain Name Hijacking. The Panel explained:

In the present case, the Complainant did not provide any explanation as to how the Respondent could possibly have been aware of the Complainant and the Complainant’s mark when registering the disputed domain name, which occurred more than three years before the Complainant started using its XpanD Mark. The Panel therefore accepts the Respondent’s allegation that the Complainant is using the UDRP as an alternative purchase strategy after the acquisition of the disputed domain name failed. Therefore, the Panel finds that the Complaint was brought in bad faith, in an attempt of reverse domain name hijacking: The Complainant knew or should have known at the time it filed the Complaint that it could not prove that the domain name was registered in bad faith.

Ultimately the Panel DENIED the request for Transfer.

In the recent domain name dispute of Suzannah R. Noonan v. Kevin Sneed FA1343308 (Nat. Arb. Forum October 22, 2010) a single member panel was faced with a domain name dispute over the domain www.energyfix.com. Complainant claims ownership to the mark ENEGRYFIX, which was registered on July 24, 2001, filed on April 27, 2000 and bears an alleged first use date of April 1, 2000. The disputed domain was registered by Respondent on August 24, 1999, approximately seven month prior to Complainant’s first use of the mark. Respondent contended and provided supporting evidence that he began selling “superfood” products via the disputed domain name on November 28, 1999.

Paragraph 4(a) of the ICANN UDRP Policy requires that the Complainant must prove each of the following three elements to obtain an order that a domain name should be cancelled or transferred: (1) the domain name registered by the Respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the Complainant has rights; (2) the Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and (3) the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.

The Panel reviewed the elements and found that the domain was confusingly similar to Complainant’s mark. In addressing the second element the Panel made the following observations:

Under Policy ¶ 4(c)(i), use of a domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods is sufficient to establish rights or legitimate interests in the domain name for purposes of ¶ 4(a)(ii).  Respondent operated an online store using the disputed domain name for at least eight and a half years, beginning four months prior to Complainant’s first use of the ENERGYFIX mark and twenty-one months prior to the registration of that mark.  By doing so, Respondent established his rights and legitimate interest in the disputed domain name.

In addressing the third element, bad faith, the Panel continued its observations that no bad faith could have existed in light of the earlier registration of the domain compared with the first use of the mark.

The case became interesting with the Panel’s discussion regarding Reverse Domain Name Hijacking. The Panel noted:

The Panel is troubled by Complainant’s attempt to secure <energyfix.com>, a domain name that was registered and used to sell goods for months before Complainant’s first use of the ENERGYFIX mark.  A simple WHOIS search would have informed Complainant that the disputed domain name had been registered seven months before her first use of the ENERGYFIX mark and therefore could not have been registered in bad faith.  It is also evident from the Complaint that Complainant was aware that Respondent was selling goods using the disputed domain name, one of the activities that gives rise to rights and legitimate interests in a domain name….A long delay in filing a complaint can also give rise to an inference that a complainant with a flawed claim knew that it had a flawed claim, providing further support for a finding of bad faith.

Ultimately, the Panel found that Complainant failed to prove the elements and made a finding that Complainant engaged in Reverse Domain Name Hijacking.

In the recent cybersquatting case of Ford Motor Company v. Boomerang Enterprises Inc., FA1344311 (Nat. Arb. Forum October 20, 2010) a single member Panel was faced with a dispute over the domains www.fiesta-armrest.com, www.fiesta-armrest.net, www.fiestaarmrest.com, www.fiestaarmrest.net, and www.fordfiestaarmrest.com. Ford is the well known longstanding car company which needs no introduction. Ford maintains a website at www.ford.com. Ford owns numerous trademark registrations for its FIESTA vehicle. Respondent is an official Ford approved vendor. Respondent claims that it registered and developed the domain names with Ford’s approval and encouragement. As a result Respondent sought to have this dispute not handled under the UDRP, noting that it was contractual and fell outside the purview of the UDRP. The Panel reviewed the information and disagreed with Respondent position regarding the coverage of the UDRP on the facts at issue.

Complainant claims that it has established the elements outlined by the UDRP, and that Respondent’s arguments about Complainant and Respondent’s relationship do not provide sufficient reason for the Panel not to decide the case. Complainant and Respondent have provided sufficient evidence for the Panel to properly decide the dispute under the UDRP, the Panel may thus proceed with the case and consider the contentions of Complainant and Respondent.

Paragraph 4(a) of the ICANN UDRP Policy requires that Complainant must prove each of the following three elements to obtain an order that a domain name should be cancelled or transferred: (1) the domain name registered by Respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which Complainant has rights; and (2) Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and (3) the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.

The Panel reviewed and applied the elements finding that Complaint satisfied all three. Of interesting note, the Panel reviews the concept of disclaimers in avoiding bad faith.

Complainant argues that a disclaimer posted on a website is too late to avoid confusion among Internet users. Complainant claims that Internet users are misdirected to Respondent’s website before seeing the disclaimer.  Therefore, Complainant contends that Respondent’s disclaimer does not mitigate Respondent’s bad faith registration and use of the disputed domain names. In view of the circumstances of the present case, the Panel finds accordingly that the disclaimer posted on Respondent’s website by Respondent is insufficient to prevent a finding of bad faith under Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii) since it does not prevent initial confusion and may be disregarded by Internet users. See Continental Airlines, Inc. v. Vartanian, FA 1106528 (Nat. Arb. Forum Dec. 26, 2007) (“Respondent’s use of a disclaimer does note mitigate a finding of bad faith under Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii) “); see also Ciccone v. Parisi, D2000-0847 (WIPO Oct. 12, 2000) (“Respondent’s use of a disclaimer on its website is insufficient to avoid a finding of bad faith.  First, the disclaimer may be ignored or misunderstood by Internet users.  Second, a disclaimer does nothing to dispel initial interest confusion that is inevitable from Respondent’s actions.  Such confusion is a basis for finding a violation of Complainant’s rights.”).

Ultimately, the Panel was not swayed by arguments presented by Respondent. Respondent did seek a finding of Reverse Domain Name Hijacking, which the Panel also rejected. The domains were ordered to be TRANSFERRED.

In the recent domain name dispute of Red Bull GmbH v. Roy Kenneth Nabben (WIPO Case No. D2010-1358, September 30, 2010) a single member Panel was faced with a dispute over the domain www.redbullnorge.com. RED BULL is the well known energy drink which does not need much of in introduction. RED BULL maintains a website at www.redbull.com. Respondent filed a response noting that the domain was registered in order for Respondent to sell Red Bull to residents of Norway. “Norge” means Normway, thus the domain name was aptly chosen in light of the proposed usage. The decision explained that the sale of the drink in Norway was not legal, and the parties would work toward getting the product legalized for sale in Norway. The decision notes that the relationship between the parties was done by agreement, and that RED BULL knew and approved of Respondents registration and use of the domain.

In accordance with paragraph 4(a) of the ICANN UDRP Policy, in order to succeed in this proceeding, the Complainant must prove (i) that the Domain Name is identical or confusingly similar to a mark in which it has rights; (ii) that the Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the Domain Name; and (iii) that the Domain Name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.

The Panel quickly found that the first prong of confusingly similar was met. Then the Panel also quickly dispensed of the second prong, noting that under 4(a)(ii) of the UDRP the registrant can satisfy this prong by showing that it once had such rights but no longer retains a right to use the disputed domain name.

The crux of the case came down to the third element, bad faith registration and use. The Panel explained:

[T]he Panel considers that, to satisfy the third requirement of the UDRP, a complainant must show that the domain name was both registered in bad faith and is being used in bad faith, and that a registration originally made in good faith cannot turn into a registration in bad faith because the registrant subsequently uses it in bad faith. Bad faith use can be evidence of bad faith registration but cannot convert a registration which was in fact made in good faith into a registration made in bad faith…But where a company consents to the registration by a trading partner of a domain name incorporating its mark, the company can readily protect itself by securing a clear written agreement specifying that it will own the domain name after the trading relationship comes to an end; and the agreement can further specify a cost effective means of dispute resolution. At all events this situation is a long way from the mischief which the UDRP was devised and adopted to address, namely the abusive registration of domain names which are identical or confusingly similar to the marks of other parties without their consent. In any case, the Panel is obliged to apply the UDRP as it is, rather than as it could or should be.

Ultimately the Panel found that RED BULL failed to satisfy all three elements and DENIED the request for transfer.

In the recent cybersquatting case of Pamela Anderson v. Alberta Hot Rods Case No. D2010-1144 (WIPO September 8, 2010) a three member panel was faced with a dispute over the domain www.pamanderson.com. Pamela Anderson is well known for her acting and modeling. She has multiple trademark registration for the mark PAMELA ANDERSON. She maintains a website at www.pamelaanderson.com. Respondent registered the disputed domain on March 1, 1997 and filed a Response to the Complaint. The parties have been involved in an earlier UDRP proceeding concerning the domain names <pamelaanderson.com>, <pamelaanderson.net> and <pamelalee.com>, which resulted in the transfer of those domain names (see Pamela Anderson v. Alberta Hot Rods, WIPO Case No. D2002-1104).

Under paragraph 4(a) of the ICANN UDRP Policy, the Complainant must prove that each of the following three elements is present: (i) the disputed domain name is identical or confusingly similar to the Complainant’s trademark; and (ii) the Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the disputed domain name; and (iii) the disputed domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.

In addressing the first element, the Panel explained that it must view Anderson’s rights in the mark based on common law, since the Federal trademark rights do not predate the registration of the domain. A discussion of common law rights extending to an abbreviation of Anderson’s first name from PAMELA to PAM, concluded in a finding that it could be found to be confusingly similar. The Panel was satisfied that the domain was confusingly similar to the mark.

Moving on to the second element, the Panel noted that Anderson claims the Respondent is not commonly known by the disputed domain and does not have authorization to use the domain or mark. The Panel noted the following arguments presented by Respondent:

The Respondent claims to have, as a respected publisher of a wealth of information, including biographical data, used the disputed domain name in connection with various websites in the past, all featuring biographical information about various famous personalities, dead or alive. However, the Respondent did not provide any evidence of any contemplated good faith use and therefore failed to prove rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name under the Policy.

The Panel found this element also favored Complainant. Moving onto the final element, bad faith registration and use, the Panel made the following observations regarding Respondent knowledge and actions.

Given the Complainant’s broad media coverage and the fact that the Respondent registered the disputed domain name in a chronological sequence with the domain names disputed in Pamela Anderson v. Alberta Hot Rods, supra, (<pamelaanderson.com> registered on November 6, 1996; <pamanderson.com> registered on March 1, 1997; <pamelalee.com> registered on March 27, 1997; <pamelaanderson.net> registered on February 25, 1998), it is inconceivable that the Respondent registered the disputed domain name without knowledge of the Complainant’s rights. This finding is further supported by the fact that the Complainant seems drawn towards registering well-known people’s names as domain names and therefore seems to be familiar with or at least interested in celebrities. The Panel is therefore satisfied that the Respondent registered the disputed domain name in bad faith under paragraph 4(a)(iii) of the Policy.

The Panel also applied the consensus view regarding lack of active use of a domain, and explained “In the view of the Panel, the facts of this case do not allow for any plausible actual or contemplated active use of the disputed domain name by the Respondent in good faith. The Panel is therefore convinced that, even though the disputed domain name has not yet been actively used, the Respondent’s non-use of the disputed domain name amounts to use in bad faith.”

Ultimately, the Panel found that all elements were satisfied and ordered the domain be Transferred. This decision was not unanimous though as one of the Panelists provided a dissenting opinion. Additionally, The Panel dismissed the request for Reverse Domain Name Highjacking presented by Respondent.

In another domain name dispute filed by RAPIDSHARE, the concept of owning the word RAPID was denied for the third time. In RapidShare AG and Christian Schmid v. Protected Domain Services Customer ID: NCR-785723/ n/a Sergey Vlasov (WIPO Case No. D2010-1106, August 27, 2010) a single member Panel was faced with a dispute over the domain www.rapid4me.com. We have previously blogged about the two prior failures of RAPIDSHARE’s attempts to own the word “rapid.” However, each time the Panel has found this was too much and that RAPIDSHARE did not use RAPID as a mark and was not commonly known by the name RAPID.

To succeed, the Complainant must demonstrate that all of the elements enumerated in paragraph 4(a) of the Policy have been satisfied: (i) the disputed domain name is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the Complainant has rights; and (ii) the Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the disputed domain name; and (iii) the disputed domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.

In this case the Panel cited to some of the prior decisions, both for and against RAPIDSHARE, and noted that in the prior denial cases, such as RapidShare AG, Christian Schmid v. N/A Maxim Tvortsov, WIPO Case No. D2010-0696, that Panel found that www.rapidbay.net was not able to be transferred under the policy. This Panel adopted many of the same arguments, however did not get past the first element of whether or not the domain was identical or confusingly similar to the RAPIDSHARE mark. The Panel chose not to review the remaining elements.

It is always interesting when a large media outlet writes up an article about legal topics, but it is even more interesting when they write one up about cybersquatting. The New York Times published an article today about the political environment where cybersquatters go after domains containing candidates’ names. For an interesting read of the article, click here. The article is laden with examples of political names and associated domains, but lacks any substance related to the law. It does not even mention the use of the UDRP. This is the media’s attempt at telling the masses about this topic.

In the recent domain name dispute decision of RapidShare AG and Christian Schmid v. Ilya, Ilya Efimov WIPO Case No. D2010-1105 (August 17, 2010) a single member Panel was faced with a dispute over the domain www.rapid.org. As we previously posted on July 13, 2010, RAPID SHARE tried to claim rights to the word RAPID when seeking to get the “rapidbay.net” domain. (See post here) Complaint, Rapid Share is the well known file-hosting website which maintains a website at www.rapidshare.com. The Respondent did file a reply to the Complaint, and cited to the previous decision regarding RAPIDSHARE’s lack of rights to the word RAPID. Complainant owns a Community Trademark for RAPIDSHARE with a priority date of 2005.

Under Paragraph 4(a) of the ICANN UDRP Policy, a complainant has the burden of proving the following: (i) That the disputed domain name is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the complainant has rights; and (ii) That the respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the disputed domain name; and (iii) That the disputed domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.

The Panel in this case made similar findings to the previous rapidbay.net decision. The Panel noted that no evidence was put forth by RAPIDSHARE to show that it was frequently referred to as “RAPID.” The Panel found this to be fatal to Complainant’s case. Ultimately, the Panel found that Complainant failed to establish identical or confusingly similar elements as required under the policy. The Panel DENIED the request for transfer.

In the recent cybersquatting case of Disney Enterprises, Inc. v. ll aka Joe Comeau FA1336979 (Nat. Arb. Forum, August 31, 2010) a single member Panel was faced with a dispute over the domain www.DisneyOffer.com. Disney needs no introduction in this case. You should know who they are, unless you have been living in the one or two places where they haven’t been able to advertise or sell products and services. Either way, go to www.disney.com for anything your heart desires. Respondent filed a response to this dispute and presented some interesting arguments.

Paragraph 4(a) of the ICANN UDRP Policy requires that the Complainant must prove each of the following three elements to obtain an order that a domain name should be cancelled or transferred: (1) the domain name registered by the Respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the Complainant has rights; (2) the Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and (3) the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.

The Panel quickly dispensed with the first prong, noting that the DISNEY mark is well established and that the disputed domain contained all of the mark including the additional word “offers.”

Moving to the second prong, the Panel noted that DISNEY had met its small initial burden of proving a prima facie case that Respondent lacked any rights or interests. This included claims that Respondent was not commonly known by the disputed domain. The Panel shifted the burden to Respondent and explained:

Respondent offers no evidence which might tend to show that he has rights in respect of  the domain name pursuant to Policy ¶4(c), or otherwise. Respondent offers no explanation as to why he registered a domain name which overtly references Complainant’s DISNEY trademark and he admits he has not built a website associated with the disputed domain name. Respondent states that the webpage referenced by the at-issue domain name is merely a holding page provided by the registrar, Go-Daddy. Respondent makes no claims regarding any intended use for the domain name.  Furthermore, Respondent makes no claims that he is somehow making a legitimate non-commercial or fair use of the domain name.

The Panel thus found that this second prong was proven. Moving to the third prong, bad faith, the Panel made some relevant findings. First the Paenl explained Respondent failed to present any justification that he did not register the domain name for any r3eason other then the value of the mark. Additionally, the Panel found that Respondent had registered well known domain names in the past using other marks such as EBAY and CHEVY.

The Panel found that Respondent offered to sell the disputed domain to DISNEY after recieving a cease and desist letter, which was is evidence of bad faith registration and use pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(b)(I). Respondent had argued that “If Respondent has to turn over the domain name to Complainant, it should at least in good faith have to give Respondent the renewal fees paid over the past few years.” Other interesting arguments presented by Respondent included:

Just because Complainant holds onto the name “disney” it does not have the right to squash and try to control every other holder of the word “disney” in the English speaking community or every domain name with the word “disney” in it. They own the market and brand name, but they do not own the word “disney” across the entire English language as long as those interests pose no threat or try to infringe upon their business.

Lastly, the Panel found that the disputed domain resolved to a parked site, featuring links to third parties offering competing goods and services. For all these reasons, the Panel found that DISNEY met its burden of proving all three prongs and ordered the domain be TRANSFERRED.

In the recent domain name dispute decision My Health, Inc. v. Top Tier Consulting, Inc. FA1332064 (Nat. Arb. Forum August 26, 2010) a single member Panel was faced with a dispute over the domain www.myhealth.com. Complainant is owns a trademark for MY HEALTH, related to, among other things, a website for medical professionals. Additionally, Complainant maintains a website at www.myhealthincorporated.com. Respondent filed a Response to the dispute, contending it registered the domain prior to the Complainant ever being in business.

Paragraph 4(a) of the ICANN UDRP Policy requires that the Complainant must prove each of the following three elements to obtain an order that a domain name should be cancelled or transferred: (1) the domain name registered by the Respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the Complainant has rights; (2) the Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and (3) the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.

 Both parties made objections to the level of authenticity of documents required, but the Panel explained as follows: “The Panel reminds the parties of UDRP Policy Rules ¶¶ 3(b)(xv), 5(b)(ix), and 10(d), which in sum direct all parties to submit their complete evidence and that the Panel ‘shall determine the admissibility, relevance, materiality and weight of the evidence.’”

Moving onto the substance of the dispute, the Panel quickly found that the disputed domain was identical or confusingly similar to Complainant’s mark under Policy ¶ 4(a)(i). In addressing the next prong, whether the Respondent had any rights or legitimate interests in the domain, the Panel explained that Complainant made its prima facie case. The Panel found that “Respondent’s failure to make an active use of the disputed domain name for the last three years is evidence that Respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests in the disputed domain name as Respondent is not using the disputed domain name for either a bona fide offering of goods and services pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c)(i) or a legitimate noncommercial or fair use pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii).” The Panel also noted that the burden then shifted to Respondent to prove otherwise.

The Panel then detailed Respondents assertions about its preparations for the website as follows:

Respondent argues that it has made efforts to seek funding for its medical website and has thus demonstrated use and preparations to use the disputed domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services, namely personal healthcare and related services.  Respondent asserts that its goal has been to use the disputed domain name for a consumer healthcare portal website to put healthcare in the hands of patients and doctors, where appointments with doctors can be made, prior visits confirmed, physician consults made online, and informed decisions made when searching for a new physician.  Respondent further asserts that it has conducted a number of meetings to develop the website by either financing or joint ventures. 

Interestingly, the Panel agreed and found that these preparations were a bona fide offering of goods or services. The Panel moved onto the final prong, bad faith, and explained that there was no evidence presented by Complainant of any bad faith purchase or use of the disputed domain.

Respondent asserts, correctly, that there is no evidence that Respondent has either registered or used the domain name in bad faith as Respondent registered the disputed domain name more than fourteen months before Complainant or its MY HEALTH mark even existed.  Respondent indicates that it purchased the <myhealth.com> domain name in early February 2007 for $150,000.   Respondent further contends that this was long before Complainant’s first use of the MY HEALTH mark in mid-April 2008.  The Panel finds that Respondent’s purchase and registration of the disputed domain name nearly fourteen months before Complainant’s first use of its mark in commerce is evidence that Respondent has not engaged in bad faith registration as defined in the Policy.

The Panel, on its own noted that it could be determined that this was a case of reverse domain name hijacking, but since it was not raised nor briefed by either party it would not make such a finding. Ultimately, the Panel found that Complainant failed to establish all the elements and DENIED the request for transfer.