In a very interesting decision, a three member Panel appears to stretch the limits of what is acceptable evidence and methodology for UDRP cases. In the case of Ray Marks Co. LLC v. Rachel Ray Techniques Pvt. Ltd. FA1319966 (Nat. Arb. Forum, July 7, 2010) the Panel was faced with a dispute over the domain www.rachelray.com. Living in the U.S. most of us have all seen on t.v. or heard about Rachael Ray. She maintains a website at www.rachaelray.com  Many would even think this was a slam dunk case for her, since the disputed domain was merely missing a letter. However, Respondent put up a fight and both parties provided additional submissions. As a result the Panel was faced with making some interesting findings.

Paragraph 4(a) of the ICANN UDRP Policy requires that the Complainant must prove each of the following three elements to obtain an order that a domain name should be cancelled or transferred: (1) the domain name registered by the Respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the Complainant has rights; (2) the Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and (3) the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.

Some of the relevant arguments presented by Respondent are as follows:

Respondent, Rachel Ray Techniques Private Limited, is a company incorporated in India on July 23, 2009.  Respondent offers products that involve laser ray technology.  Prior to incorporation, Respondent was operated as a partnership that began April 10, 2007….The Complaint misstates the date of the cease and desist letter.  It was sent on February 24, 2010, not February 24, 2009.  This is an attempt by Complainant to mislead the Panel by creating the impression that the letter was sent prior to Respondent’s incorporation on July 23, 2009….Respondent selected the name “Rachel Ray” for its business because the daughter of the technical partner of the original firm was named “Rachel”.  The initial name for the company was going to be “Rachel Lazer Techniques”, but, for reasons related to the practice of numerology, there was a decision to switch to “Rachel Ray Techniques”.

In the decision, the Panel presented the following findings:

Respondent is the owner of the disputed domain name, <rachelray.com>, and the date of creation is September 20, 2001.  The Respondent acquired the name some time later. Respondent is a corporation organized under the laws of India on July 23, 2009, after having been formed as a partnership on April 10, 2007.

With that in mind the Panel reviewed the elements and quickly found that the domain was identical or confusingly similar. The fascinating parts of the decision came during the examination of the second element. The Panel found that the burden was shifted to Respondent to prove it had rights or legitimate interests in the domain. It stated as follows:

Respondent claims to have formed a company in April 2007, which was incorporated in 2009, to market laser-based equipment and other items.  Respondent has supplied the Panel with scads of evidence (Annexes A through W), citing its business name on advertisements, telephone listings, invoices and Indian governmental documents, to support its contention.

However, the Complaint provided evidence that the disputed domain hosted websites that offered Complainants own trademark. Respondent chalked this up to error and lack of control over third party hosting, exclaiming that they are not technical people. Armed with that argument, the Panel made the following statement.

The Panel is presented therefore with competing claims on this issue.  UDRP proceedings provide for only limited evidentiary presentations, and it is difficult for the Panel to make fine assessments as to veracity.  One tool it can employ in this regard is to examine each party’s contentions for consistency.  On this issue, the Panel finds no inconsistency in Complainant’s assertions, whereas there is marked inconsistency with respect to those made by Respondent.  Respondent’s declaration about “not being technical people” is contradicted by Respondent earlier Additional Submission reference to its “technical partner”.  Moreover, that contradiction is heightened by Respondent’s claim to run a business that offers products “using the Technology involving Laser Rays”, which suggests that Respondent’s people must possess fairly sophisticated technical expertise.

Additionally, the Panel found that the lack of proof of sales volume or revenue in connection with products was fatal. Then the Panel turned its attention to the issue of whether Respondent was commonly known by the domain. AS stated earlier Respondents company name specifically includes the domain, but the Panel did not care.

However, it has not escaped the Panel’s notice that the date of Respondent’s origination, April 10, 2007, followed hard upon the date, March 27, 2007, of the USPTO registration of Complainant’s most basic trademark, RACHAEL RAY.  Is this coincidence or design?  Though Respondent is an Indian entity, the miracle of the Internet makes knowledge of such information as USPTO registrations almost instantaneous around the globe, and the Panel must keep in mind that the initiation of the Policy is predicated on the cunning and sophistication of global cyber-squatters. As discussed above, Respondent has provided the Panel with scant evidence of actually conducting business.  Consequently, the Panel cannot conclude that Respondent is  commonly known by that name, as is necessary for application of subparagraph 4(c)(ii).  The Panel believes that that subparagraph requires more than evidence suggesting a hastily formed “paper” company which adopts a name that is nearly indistinguishable from an established trademark and, soon after formation, acquires a corresponding domain name.

The Panel quickly resolved the bad faith element of the case. Ultimately, the Panel ruled that domain be TRANSFERRED.

There have been two interesting domain name disputes in two days, dealing with the same mark, resulting in the same manner, but for different reasons. IN the wacky world of domain name and trademark ownership, one can never really guess as to the facts and arguments presented by parties involved in disputes. In the first case, Mt. Vernon Mills, Inc. v. River City Holdings, LLC FA1325209 (Nat. Arb. Forum June 30, 2010) a single member Panel was faced with a dispute over the domain www.textraw.com. The Panel made the following relevant factual findings.

On September 8, 2006 Complainant purchased assets from the Georgia, USA corporation Textraw, Inc. which included the trademark registration for a trademark TEXTRAW which had been registered with the USPTO under number 2,710,148 on April 22, 2003. On November 28, 2009 the TEXTRAW trademark was cancelled. Complainant had no registered TEXTRAW trademark at the date of filing its complaint. In March 2009 Respondent obtained the domain name <textraw.com> through Complainant. Respondent makes no active use of the domain name.

Paragraph 4(a) of the ICANN UDRP Policy requires that the Complainant must prove each of the following three elements to obtain an order that a domain name should be cancelled or transferred: (1) the domain name registered by the Respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the Complainant has rights; (2) the Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and (3) the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.

In light of the findings the Panel reviewed the first element and found that Complainant did not have adequate common law rights, since they failed to present evidence of adequate sales, advertising etc. or show that the mark has secondary meaning. By failing to satisfy the first element, the decision was essentially done, but the Panel chose to review the remainder of the elements. Ultimately the Panel DENIED the request for transfer.

In the second domain name dispute, Mt. Vernon Mills, Inc. v. River City Holdings FA1325214 (Nat. Arb. Forum, July 1, 2010) a single member Panel also DENIED a request for transfer regarding two domains, www.textraw.net  and www.textraw.org. The Panel noted that the parties entered into an agreement on March 16, 2009 which expired on March 15, 2010. The Domain Names were registered by Respondent during the course of that agreement. Complaint had filed a Notice of Opposition to Respondent’s application for federal trademark rights in TEXTRAW. A search of the USPTO records shows that on December 3, 2009 two applications were filed for TEXTRAW (Ser. No. 77885495 and 77885343) by a company named Synco Turf, LLC. The Panel also noted that Complaint has filed other court proceedings related to the ownership and the trademark in Court of Common Pleas, Greenville County, South Carolina, C.A. No. 2010-CP-23-4101.

In light of the court case and the TTAB case, the Panel explained that those proceedings will be critical to the outcome of this UDRP decision. As a result the Panel DENIED the relief requested by Complainant, without prejudice and may seek to refile a Complaint after the other proceedings are finished.

Walk over to any college campus bar and just say the words JAGER BOMB and you will likely get mixed reactions of joy and pain from the students. For years the JAGER BOMB has been a popular drink at bars across the country, and around the world. The people at Mast-Jaegermeister AG know this and made sure to get protection for this famous mixed drink. They have a registration for the JAGER BOMB mark and filed a UDRP domain dispute for the domain www.jager-bomb.com. In Mast-Jaegermeister AG v. John Marzlak FA1317337 (Nat. Arb. Forum, May 18, 2010) a single member Panel agreed with the liquor manufacturer and agreed to transfer the domain. Complainant maintains a website at www.jager.com.

The decision did highlight one relevant fact, which had respondent provided a response may have been fleshed out in more detail. The disputed domain was being used to promote the sale of Jager Bomb Shot Cups. Complainant made note of this and the Panel explained:

Respondent capitalizes on the confusingly similar domain name to attract Internet users seeking Complainant’s website to a website offering plastic cups for consumers to use with Complainant’s product.  Therefore, the Panel finds that such diversionary use of the disputed domain name for Respondent’s own commercial gain does not constitute a bona fide offering of goods or services under Policy ¶ 4(c)(i), or a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the domain name under Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii). 

There wasn’t anything too exciting or different about this decision. One side note, the domain www.jagebomb.com is parked with “coming soon” text and an info@jagerbomb.com email address. The domain has a privacy service so it is unclear whether Complainant owns it or whether it will be developed. Complainant appears to operate or at least authorize a website devoted to cups just for Jager bombs, namely www.jagerbombcups.com.

For those of you who don’t know, a company has a Federal Registration for the mark HOT RUSSIAN BRIDES. Complainant maintains a website at www.hotrussianbrides.com and they have previously been successful in using the UDRP to get some domains, such as www.hotrussianbrides.org, www.hotrussionbrides.com and www.hotrusianbride.com. However, they have also now lost two consecutive domain disputes when trying to get domains when their mark was incorporated into a  “post-domain.”

In the most recent case of Romantic Tours, Inc. v. LiquidNet US LLC (Whois Protection Dept.)  c/o Whois Agent FA1316585 (Nat. Arb. Forum, May 17, 2010) a single member panel was faced with a dispute over the domain www.agencyscams.com. Complainant alleged that the disputed domain contained information about Complainant and services which Complainant offered. What was interesting about this case though was Complainant’s allegations are based, not on the TLD (top level domain), but instead on the following post-domain: www.agencyscams.com/why/hotrussianbrides.

The Panel recognized that Complainant had a trademark registration for the mark HOT RUSSIAN BRIDES, but did not find the disputed domain to be confusingly similar to the mark. The Panel cited to Complainant’s previous earlier UDRP loss Romantic Tours, Inc. v. Whois Privacy Prot. Serv., Inc., FA 1316557 (Nat. Arb. Forum Apr. 28, 2010) (“The Panelist notes that the UDRP does not offer relief for infringements via use of registered trademarks in post-domains and that the proceedings under the UDRP may be applied only to domain names.”). For this reason the Panel found that the identical or confusingly similar prong was not met and therefore there was no need to review the remaining elements.  The Panel DENIED the request for transfer.

If you haven’t heard about Ashley Madison, then you are likely in a committed relationship and would never even consider cheating or you don’t pay much attention to commercials. In the recent cybersquatting case of Avid Dating Life, Inc. v. Private Whois Service FA1318204 (Nat. Arb. Forum May 13, 2010) a single member Panel was faced with a dispute over 101 domains. A full list of the domains is provided in the decision. Complainant is the owner of the well known website www.AshleyMadison.com where people can seek out others who are in committed relationships seeking to have an affair. As their own tag line states “Life is Short. Have an Affair.” No matter what you may think about such a service, it has become wildly popular and boasts nearly 6 million anonymous members. One of the disputed domains was registered in 2005, while all the others were registered in 2008 and 2009. Complainant has federal trademark rights dating back to at least 2004.

Paragraph 4(a) of the ICANN UDRP Policy requires that Complainant must prove each of the following three elements to obtain an order that a domain name should be cancelled or transferred: (1) the domain name registered by Respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which Complainant has rights; and (2) Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and (3) the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.

The Panel began its analysis noting that Complainant established rights in its ASHLEY MADISON mark under Policy ¶ 4(a)(i) through its trademark registrations with the USPTO. All of the disputed domain names contained some typographical modification to the registered mark. The Panel found these domains were confusingly similar to the registered mark since they were common misspellings. For this reason, the Panel found that Policy ¶ 4(a)(i) had been satisfied.

The second part of the analysis the Panel noted that Complainant presented a prima facie case, and although Respondent failed to respond, it still chose to review the facts. The Panel found that Respondent was not commonly known by the disputed domains. Evidence presented to the Panel included proof that two of the disputed domains contained links to competing adult dating websites.

The Panel finds that Respondent’s use of the <ashleymadis0on.com> and <ashleymadision.com> domain names to display third-party links to competitors of Complainant is not a use in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c)(i) or a legitimate noncommercial or fair use pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii).

The Complainant noted that the other 99 domains did not resolve to active websites. The Panl found that failure to make active use of the domains meant they were “not connected with a bona fide offering or goods or services pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c)(i) or a legitimate noncommercial or fair use pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii).” And lastly under this section, the Panel found “registration of the disputed domain names containing misspelled versions of Complainant’s mark is further evidence of Respondent’s lack of rights and legitimate interests in the names under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii).” For all these reasons, Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii) had been satisfied.

Moving to the final element, bad faith, the Panel repeated many of the same facts and applied them in this section as stated earlier. This includes, the third party links, the inactive websites, the typographical variations on the domain names. The Panel also found that “Respondent’s registration of many trademark infringing domain names within a short period of time is evidence of bad faith registration and use under Policy ¶ 4(b)(ii).” For all these reasons, Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii) had been satisfied.

Ultimately, the Panel found that Complainant presented and proved all three elements, and ordered the domains be TRANSFERRED.

In an odd, yet interesting recent domain name dispute, a single member Panel essentially punted on making a ruling, since the Respondent consented to the transfer. In Bond Fletcher, Chief Executive Officer c/o Typehaus, Inc. v. Brian Kemmenoe FA1316357 (Nat. Arb. Forum May 12, 2010) the dispute over the domain name www.checkjet.com barely cleared the runway before coming to a short end. Complainant has a federal registration over the mark CHECKJET for “Computer hardware and software for creating, generating and printing checks.” The disputed domain was registered in March 2007, whereas the CHECKJET trademark rights did not accrue until April 2007.
 
The domain was renewed in March 2010, shortly after Complainant put Respondent on notice of possible trademark infringement.  The Respondent replied to the dispute, noting that the domain was registered prior to the creation of any trademark rights. However, the Respondent consented to the transfer and essentially forced the hand of the Panelist. What is odd about this case is the Panelist clearly wanted to explore the facts of the case and render a full ruling.

The Panel notes that the domain name was registered before Complainant acquired any trademark rights and finds that there are no circumstances to indicate that Respondent could have had Complainant or its mark in mind when he registered the domain name in March, 2007. But for Respondent’s consent to the transfer of the domain name to Complainant, this case would have presented an opportunity to consider the careful reasoning in Eastman Sporto Group LLC v. Jim and Kenny, WIPO Case No. D2009-1688, which questions whether it is appropriate to continue to follow early Panel decisions that do not accept renewal as registration for the purposes of the Policy.

One can only wonder what the outcome would have been. It is unclear why this Panelist chose not to go through the factors, as other Panels had done, despite the Respondent’s consent for transfer. Infamous Cybersquatter Texas Property Associates often consents to the transfer, however many Panels choose to go through the full analysis anyway. Regardless, the Panel granted the TRANSFER, but made it clear there were no adverse findings to Respondent.

In the recent domain name dispute decision of 24 Hour Fitness USA, Inc. v. Privacy Locked c/o Privacy Locked LLC FA1315677 (Nat. Arb. Forum, May 6, 2010) a single member Panel was faced with a dispute over the domain www.24horfitness.com. Complainant is the well known national chain of fitness centers and maintains a website at www.24hourfitness.com. Complainant has a trademark registration for 24HOURFITNESS.COM since October 2000. Respondent failed to respond to the Complaint. 

Paragraph 4(a) of the ICANN UDRP Policy requires that Complainant must prove each of the following three elements to obtain an order that a domain name should be cancelled or transferred: (1) the domain name registered by Respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which Complainant has rights; and (2) Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and (3) the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.

The Panel began with a discussion of finding that the Complaint’s rights in the mark 24HOURFITNESS.COM were sufficient to establish trademark rights for the purposes of this dispute. “The Panel finds the misspelling of the mark in the disputed domain name does not differentiate the disputed domain name from Complainant’s mark and that the disputed domain name is confusingly similar to Complainant’s mark, pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).” 

For the second element, whether or not respondent had any rights or legitimate interests in the domain, the Panel explained that 24 Hour Fitness had presented a prima facie case, and that although the Respondent did not respond, the Panel still reviewed the facts and evidence presented. First the Panel found that Respondent’s WHOIS information showed it was not commonly known by the disputed domain name. Second the domain name resolved to a web directory with third party competitor links. For this reason, Respondent had failed to use the domain for a bona fide offering of goods ro services. Lastly since this domain was an intentional misspelling of the mark, it was considered typosquatting and thus violated the Policy.

Moving to the final element, bad faith, the Panel explained that the third party competitor links were evidence of bad faith since it would disrupt Complainant’s business. Additionally, the practice of typosquatting was found to be bad faith registration and use pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii). 

For all these reasons, the Panel found that Complainant met the requirements and ruled that the domain be TRANSFERRED.

In the recent domain name dispute decision of VRSim, Inc. v. John Makara FA1314947 (Nat Arb. Forum April 30, 2010) a single member Panel was faced with a dispute over the domain www.vrsim.com. Complainant is a Connecticut based company who creates “innovative visual environments and displays for interactive simulations.” The maintain a website at www.vrsim.net. Respondent attempted to respond to the Complaint but was late in submitting the Response in the appropriate electronic format. The Panel rejected any consideration of the Response.

Despite not reviewing the information contained in the Response, the Panel did not seem to worry too much about the factual arguments, since there was a major procedural hurdle facing Complainant, namely Res Judicata. This domain and this Respondent have been decided already under a previous decision, VRSim, Inc. v. Makara, FA 1233521 (Nat. Arb. Forum Jan. 2, 2009). Interestingly, that prior decision was based on Complainant’s failure to establish it had protectable trademark rights, since the mark was registered on the Supplemental Register. Additionally, Complainant never produce evidence showing secondary meaning.

The Panel explained that in very limited circumstances a case can be re-filed and reviewed again.

Several criteria have been set forth for determining whether a complaint may be refilled. See Grove Broad Co. Ltd. v. Telesystems Commc’ns Ltd., D2000-0703 (WIPO Nov. 10, 2000) (noting, and subsequently applying to the UDRP, the four common-law grounds for the rehearing or reconsideration of a previously filed decision as (1) serious misconduct on the part of a judge, juror, witness or lawyer; (2) perjured evidence having been offered to the court; (3) the discovery of credible and material evidence which could not have been reasonably foreseen or known at trial; or (4) a breach of natural justice).

The Panel found that Complainant failed to present anything to support the new case and barred it under the findings from the earlier case. For these reasons alone, the Panel DENIED the Complainant.

This should be a lesson to UDRP practitioners and trademark owners, to pay attention to details when filing a Complaint and to realize that some of the Panelists actually read these Complaints. In the recent domain name dispute decision of Letstalk.com, Inc. v. Inofirma, Ltd c/o Domain Administrator FA1310279 (Nat. Arb. Forum, April 21, 2010), a single member Panel made some harsh statements about the shortcomings of a Complaint filed by Citizen Hawk.  Although we would normally go through the elements and facts in the case, the important lesson for this posting is how the Panel addressed some procedural and substantive issues. The Complainant filed an Additional Submission to which the Panel provided the following ruling:

Having carefully reviewed Complainant’s initial submission, the Panel believes that it was prepared by some sort of automatic process with little or no human review.  For example, the Complaint refers throughout to “Complainant’s Mark(s)” and “Disputed Domain Name(s),” even though there is only one relevant mark and one domain name in dispute.  The Complaint includes an obviously false contention regarding the timing of the registration of the disputed domain name, and includes other extraneous boilerplate material (for example, argument and authorities for the proposition that a top-level domain is irrelevant to the question of identicality or confusing similarity—clearly inapplicable in this case, where the trademark includes “.com”). Given the lack of care devoted to the preparation of the Complaint, the Panel is not inclined to exercise its discretion to consider an Additional Submission from Complainant.  The Panel has reviewed the parties’ initial and additional submissions, and finds no compelling reason to consider any additional material in this proceeding.

The scolding by the Panel did not end there. The Panel skipped right to the third element, bad faith and explained that the facts were not sufficient in showing the Respondent was directing any of its activity towards Complainant or, Complainant’s customers. In fact, as the Panel noted in the Respondent’s argument section, the disputed domain was registered in 2003, whereas Complainant’s mark had not been registered until 2010. In light of the delay for filing the UDRP action, Respondent sought a ruling of Reverse Domain Name Hijacking. The Panel made the following observations:

Mere lack of success of the Complaint is not itself sufficient to demonstrate that it was brought in bad faith. Such a finding may be appropriate where the disputed domain name predates the Complainant’s trademark, see id., but in this case Complainant had made active use of its later-registered mark for several years prior to Respondent’s registration of the similar domain name.  Nor does the passage of time between the domain name registration and the initiation of this proceeding lend substantial support to Respondent’s claim of bad faith.  As noted above (in the discussion of the parties’ Additional Submissions) the Panel is quite troubled by the apparent carelessness with which the Complaint in this proceeding was prepared.

Ultimately, the Panel DENIED the Complainant’s requested transfer and found that Complainant had engaged in Reverse Domain Name Hijacking.

Recently some important information about the UDRP process has come to light. First, domain attorney Zak Muscovitch put out a survey of National Arbitration Forum Panelists. (Available here) Then the good folks at Domain Name Wire did a similar study of WIPO. (Available here) The interesting information from NAF shows the great difference between the amount of cases some Panelists are “assigned” compared with others.

 What was most interesting was a simple finding, that out of a possible 141 Panelist, NAF had supplied one Panelist with approximately 966 cases, out of the nearly 10,000 handled by NAF. This equates to nearly 10% of the total case count. Since many in the industry would hope this selection process was random, the numbers tell a different story.

According to the survey done by Muscovitch the following results were supplied (As of March 2010)

The top 10 most active panelists are as follows:

1. Carolyn Marks Johnson with 966 cases  10% of total cases
2. James A. Carmody with 889 cases  9.4% of total cases
3. Charles K. McCotter Jr. with 818 cases  8.6% of total cases
4. Ralph Yachnin with 720 cases  7.6% of total cases
5. Tyrus R. Atkinson Jr. with 623 cases  6.5% of total cases
6. Karl V. Fink with 499 cases  5.2% of total cases
7. John J. Upchurch with 478 cases  5% of total cases
8. Harold Kalina with 460 cases  4.8 % of total cases
9. Paul Dorf with 440 cases  4.6 % of total cases
10. Louis E. Condon with 437 cases  4.6% of total cases
The top 10 most active panelists are all from the United States.

Who are the Top 5 Panelists who deny the most claims?

1. David Bernstein  73.7% claims denied
2. David A. Einhorn  70.5% claims denied
3. Gilbert Thornton Cave  66.6% of claims denied
4. G. Gervaise Davis  62.5% claims denied
5. Daniel B. Banks  46.3% claims denied

Who are the Top 5 Panelists who transfer the most claims?

1. Harold Kalina  97.1% claims transferred
2. Ralph Yachnin  95.7% claims transferred
3. Carolyn Marks Johnston  92.7% claims transferred
4. Tyrus R. Atkinson Jr.  92.1% claims transferred
5. Charles K. McCotter Jr.  91.6% claims transferred 

Domain Name Wire then came out with a review of WIPO, and even got a response from WIPO regarding their “process” involving the selection of Panelists. The results of this survey seem to show the opposite approach by WIPO, based on the statistics. The survery found as follows:

Top 10 Panelists by Number of Cases

Willoughby, Tony 293
Abbott, Frederick M. 238
Donahey, M. Scott 236
Foster, Dennis A. 204
Barker, Sir Ian 196
Page, Richard W. 196
Limbury, Alan L. 193
Bernstein, David H. 160
Partridge, Mark 158
Perkins, David 157

Domain Name Wire received a written statement from David Roache-Turner, Head of Domain Name Dispute Resolution Section at WIPO. The important take away from this letter follows:

As to WIPO’s own panel appointment considerations, these are informed by a range of highly conservative, legally and ethically responsible factors, including: panel language capability; party and panel nationality; geographic diversity; panel availability; panel experience; jurisdictionally relevant expertise; where possible, prior cases involving parties at issue, and citation in pleadings to previous decisions; and lack of panel conflict as confirmed by declarations of independence and impartiality.

These numbers are telling, and important for an Domain Name practitioner or domain owner, in showing the contrasting nature of NAF and WIPO.