In the recent domain name dispute decision of Ville de Paris v. Jeff Walter WIPO D2009-1278, November 19, 2009, a single member Panel was faced with a dispute over the domain www.parvi.org. Complainant is the City of Paris, France, who claims ownership of two French trademark registrations from 2002 for PARVI (for communications by computer terminals) and PARVI PARIS VILLE NUMERIQUE (for computerized file management and communications by computer terminals). Respondent registered the disputed domain in June 2006. The background story of this case involves a series of communications between the parties regarding Respondent’s use and continued ownership of the domain. Essentially, the Respondent contended he registered the domain with no knowledge of Paris’ PARVI marks and instead picked the word because it meant “small” in Latin and was to be used for a social networking site. Paris even acknowledged that he lacked the intention of causing confusion when he registered the domain. Apparently, sometime later Respondent then changed his mind and was going to run a web site dedicated to open source software projects. The resulting domain dispute occurred.

Generally, paragraph 4(a) of the ICANN UDRP Policy requires that Complainant must prove each of the following three elements to obtain an order that a domain name should be cancelled or transferred: (1) the domain name registered by Respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which Complainant has rights; and (2) Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and (3) the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith. In the instant case however, the Panel took some liberties and has made some interesting interpretations of the Policy and prior case decisions.

First, the Panel quickly dispelled with the first element, noting that it was identical to Paris’ PARVI trademark. The Panel also quickly rolled through the second element, noting that the word parvi is not Latin for small, but instead the correct word is parvus. The Panel found that Respondent failed to show demonstrable preparations for the domain and thus lacked any rights or legitimate interests.

The Panel spent most of the decision discussing the third element, registration and use in bad faith. Paragraph 4(a)(iii) states that Complainant must prove that Respondent’s “domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.” The Panel explained that recently many decisions have reviewed the interpretation of this policy paragraph to mean something slightly different then it has been applied. The Panel explained:

The Policy expressly states that the Paragraph 4(b) scenarios are “without limitation” – that is, the Policy makes clear that there can be other scenarios that are also evidence of registration and use in bad faith. It follows, therefore, that the Policy expressly recognizes that the Paragraph 4(a)(iii) requirement of bad faith can, in certain circumstances, be satisfied where the respondent has used the domain name in bad faith, even though the respondent may not have been acting in bad faith at the time of acquisition of the domain name.

The Panel attempted to justify its findings, based upon a hypotheical:

There seems no reason in logic or in principle why the availability of redress should be confined to situations where bad faith is present at the time of acquisition of the domain name. To limit the trademark owner’s redress in this way would result in outcomes that make no sense. In particular, it would mean that even the most damaging abuse of a trademark right through the most egregious bad faith use of a domain name would be immune from remedy under the Policy so long as the registrant was not acting in bad faith when the domain name was acquired. It would, in short, give a “green light” to good faith domain name registrants to later abusively use their domain names, safe in the knowledge that any such bad faith use could not provide the basis for a successful action under the Policy.

The Panel found that Respodent probably did not register the disputed domain with the intention of benefitting from Pari’s PARVI mark, but this did not end the decision.

The Respondent’s decision to change the intended use of the disputed domain name to a use that could cause confusion with, and disruption to, the Complainant’s activities, and the Respondent’s demand that the Complainant provide it with an option to acquire the Complainant’s domain names, were actions by which the Respondent sought to use its registration of the disputed domain name to derive a benefit from the Complainant’s trademark.

Ultimately, the Panel found that Complainant satisfied all three elements, and ordered the domain be TRANSFERRED.

In the recent domain name dispute decision of SAP AG v. Harrison Barnes (WIPO D2009-1298, November 18, 2009), a single member Panel was faced with a dispute over the domain www.sapcrossing.com. Complainant, SAP, is a global provider of business software and maintains a web site at www.sap.com. SAP claims to own over 600 domains with the SAP mark incorporated therein. Respondent, claims to run a job posting web site with industry specific jobs for each site. Respondent claims to have over 140 web sites with each being industry specific and adding the suffix “crossing” at the end of the domain. It appears as though Respondent’s main web site is www.employmentcrossing.com. Respondent registered the disputed domain in October 2007.

Paragraph 4(a) of the ICANN UDRP Policy requires that the Complainant must prove each of the following three elements to obtain an order that a domain name should be cancelled or transferred: (1) the domain name registered by the Respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the Complainant has rights; (2) the Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and (3) the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.

In addressing the first element, the Panel noted that SAP proved it was the owner of trademark rights in SAP and was a recognizable source of IT related services throughout the world. The Panel concluded that the use of a well known trademark, namely SAP, with the descriptive term “crossing” was confusingly similar to Complainant’s mark.

Moving to the second element, Respondent argued that he was offering bona fide services to job seekers. The Panel explained:

There is no doubt that Respondent is entitled to use its “EmploymentCrossing” domain name to attract potential employers or employees interested in SAP software. It may also be legitimate to refer to the company SAP in the course of communications between interested parties. In the Panel’s view it is however a different matter to use the SAP trademark in the Domain Name itself, particularly in the dominant first part of the Domain Name and in doing so to acknowledge that such reference is to the company SAP. That is, to use the SAP trademark as an indication of product or service origin, in circumstances in which it is acknowledged that Respondent is not affiliated with Complainant in any way and has not been authorized by Complainant to use the SAP trademark.

The Panel concluded that SAP proved the second element. Moving to the final element, bad faith, the Panel rejected Respondents arguments that job seekers looking for jobs that require SAP proficiency merit its use of the term in the domain name. For these reasons, the Panel found that Respondent registered the domain in bad faith.

Ultimately, the Panel found that SAP proved all three elements and ordered the domain be TRANSFERRED.

For anyone following UDRP cases, this one was highly anticipated. The case of Mercury Radio Arts, Inc. and Glenn Beck v. Isaac Eiland-Hall (WIPO D2009-1182, October 29, 2009) dealt with the domain www.glennbeckrapedandmurderedayounggirlin1990.com. (For all the case filings and opinion please go here.) If you don’t know anything about this case you should read the full decision to get an understanding of the UDRP process. It seems as though Mr. Beck got a taste of his own rhetoric today, but if you want to know more about him visit his web site at www.glennbeck.com. Our friend Marc Randazza has won another case with some very “eloquent” language in his pleadings and has provided many First Amendment proponents with a significant case for later use.

Essentially, the Panel found that the domain was confusingly similar to Mr. Beck’s trademark. The case turned on the issue of whether the domain was being used in a manner consistent with the First Amendment rights to publish satyrical content. The Panel believed that the disputed domain was a parody and should be afforded such protection. The Panel explained:

It can be and has been argued by Complainant that the disputed domain name should be assessed “standing alone” because at least some Internet viewers will only have that first impression (i.e., they will not click through).  However, this case involves a form of speech arguably strongly protected under the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.  This Panel is very reluctant to reject Respondent’s claim of legitimate noncommercial and fair use on the distinction between viewing of the disputed domain name itself and clicking through to Respondent’s website.  On the same basis by which the Panel has determined the disputed domain name is confusingly similar to Complainant’s trademark – that is, Internet users viewing the disputed domain name will be curious and motivated to visit the website – the Panel also considers that Respondent’s speech should be assessed as a whole, both by reference to the disputed domain name and the content of Respondent’s website (i.e., on the assumption the preponderance of Internet users will indeed click through).

The Panel did not address any issues of bad faith since they found that there was legitimate rights involved. The Panel stated “The Panel notes, however, that the combination of political speech engaged in by Respondent and the substantial lack of commercial intent makes it unlikely to this Panel that Complainant would have succeeded in demonstrating bad faith registration and use.”
A large tip of the hat goes out to Mr. Randazza for a great win.

Update: The Respondent pulled a fast one on Mr. Beck and relinquished the domain. See his letter to Beck (here)

In the recent domain name dispute decision of Ashley Judd v. Alberta Hot Rods, Jeff Burgar (WIPO D2009-1099, September 25, 2009), a single member Panel was faced with a dispute over the domain www.ashleyjudd.com. Judd is the well known actress who has appeared in countless film and television roles throughout the 1990′s and 2000′s. Respondent registered the disputed domain in 1996 and failed to reply to the Complaint.

In accordance with paragraph 4(a) of the Policy, in order to succeed in this proceeding, the Complainant must prove (i) that the Domain Name is identical or confusingly similar to a mark in which she has rights; (ii) that the Respondents have no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the Domain Name; and (iii) that the Domain Name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.

In addressing the first element, the Panel noted that Judd had common law rights in her name.

It is well-established that where an actor has a sufficient reputation for her professional work under her name or stage name, that name is a marke in which she has rights for the purpose of the UDRP: see, for example, Julia Fiona Roberts v. Russell Boyd, WIPO Case No. D2000-0210. The Panel finds on the evidence that the Complainant has amply sufficient reputation to satisfy this requirement. As a result, the Panel found the Judd satisfied the first element.

Moving to the second element, the Panel found that Respondent had failed to use the domain in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services. Instead the panel found that the disputed domain was used to drive traffic to another web site with the intention of obtaining revenue from sponsored links. The Panel also found that Respondent was not commonly known by the disputed domain.

Moving to the final element, bad faith, the Panel noted that Judd’s reputation as an actress had been well established by 1996. Additionally, the Panel found that Respondent engaged in a pattern of registering domain containing names of famous actors and celebrities. The Panel declined to apply any possible defense of laches. Ultimately, the Panel found that there was no contrary evidence and concluded that Judd satisfied all the elements. The Panel ordered the domain be TRANSFERRED.

In the recent domain name dispute decision of TRS Quality, Inc. v. Gu Bei (WIPO D2009-1077, September 25, 2009) a single member Panel was faced with a dispute over the domain www.radioshacksucks.com. Complainant is the parent company of the Radio Shack Corporation (now known as “the Shack” if you have seen the new ads). They maintain a web site at www.radioshack.com and own numerous U.S. trademark registrations for the RADIO SHACK mark. The disputed domain was registered on April 27, 2007 and Respondent failed to respond to the Complaint.

Paragraph 4(a) of the UDRP Policy directs that the Complainant must prove each of the following: (i) that the Domain Name registered by the Respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or a service in which the Complainant has rights; and (ii) that the Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the Domain Name; and (iii) that the Domain Name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.

In addressing the first element, the Panel found that the domain contained all of Complainant’s mark with the addition of the generic word sucks. The Panel explained:

Indeed, considering the vulgar and offensive meaning of the term, it is unlikely to believe that companies would publish a website with such a self-denigrating domain name. On these grounds are based some panel decisions which concluded that a domain name containing a well-known trademark and the term “sucks” is not “confusingly similar” to the mark included in the domain name.

But the Panel also noted:

However, as held i.a. in La Quinta Worldwide L.L.C. v. Heartland Times LLC, MD Sullivan, WIPO Case No. D2007-1660, “it is not self-evident that Internet users would always take notice of the slang word following the trademark in the Domain Name and recognize its negative import”, also in light of the fact that many Internet users potentially interested in the Complainant’s services accessing to the web site “www.radioshacksucks.com” may be not fluent English-speakers.

The Panel found that Radio Shack met its first element burden and moved to the second element. The Panel noted that Complainant showed a prima facie case and explained the necessity to review the contents of the disputed domain. The Panel relied on a previous decision for the standard to apply in such a case:

Simply having a domain name with “-sucks” in the name cannot, by itself, establish fair use; one must look to the content of the website to determine if there is an exercise of free speech which allows the Respondent to rely on the fair use exception. To do otherwise would legitimize cybersquatters, who intentionally redirect traffic from a famous mark, simply through the use of a derogatory term.

In light of this the Panel found that Respondent’s domain did not point toward a legitimate gripe web site, and instead contained pay-per-click links at third party commercial web sites. The Panel also found that there is no relationship between the Complainant and Respondent and that no licence or authorization was present.

The Panel found the second element was satisfied and moved onto the last element of bad faith.  The Panel found that Respondent must have known about Complainant due to its 85 year existence prior to registration of the domain. The panel further explained that the third party pay per click links on the pages resulted in an attempt to attract users to the web site for commercial gain. Lastly the Panel found that Respondent’s failure to respond was bad faith.

Ultimately, the Panel found that Radio Shack satisfied all elements and ordered the domain be TRANSFERRED.

In the recent domain name decision of National Association of Competitive Soccer Clubs v. Bruce Binler (WIPO, D2009-0957, September 7, 2009), a single member panel was faced with a dispute over the domain www.usclubsoccer.net. Complainant is a non-for profit organization responsible for putting together soccer clubs, leagues and tournaments across the U.S. Complainant maintains a web site at www.usclubsoccer.org and has a servicemark registration for US CLUB SOCCER. Respondent registered the domain in 2007 and failed to provide a response to the Complaint.

Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy sets forth three elements that must be established by a complainant to merit a finding that a respondent has engaged in abusive domain name registration and use, and to obtain relief. These elements are that: (i) respondent’s domain name is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the complainant has rights; and (ii) respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and (iii) respondent’s domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.

Some of the facts presented included that Respondent used the domain in connection with promoting soccer events sanctioned by Complainant in 2006 and 2007.These facts may have been relevant in the Panel’s findings, however, the Panel did not make it passed the first element.

The Panel found that Complainant did not establish sufficient rights in the mark US CLUB SOCCER. The Panel noted that Complainant’s citation to a federal registration failed to inform the Panel that it was actually on the Supplemental Register.

Complainant does not enjoy a presumption of service mark rights based on registration of US CLUB SOCCER on the Supplemental Register of the USPTO. Complainant does not enjoy any presumption of rights based on the submission of a recent application for registration of the same term on the Principal Register of the USPTO.

Although Complainant has recently applied again to the USPTO for the same mark seeking registration on the Principal Register. Therefore, the Panel noted that Complainant must show that it had sufficient common law rights. The Panel was concerned that the USPTO rejected the original application for being primarily geographically descriptive with terms that are generic or merely descriptive. The Panel took some liberties in doing some market reserach and made the following observations:

Critically however, Complainant did not address the question whether the terms are commonly descriptive or generic. In the interests of fairness, the Panel performed Google and Bing searches for CLUB SOCCER together. Those searches returned many millions of “hits”. While Complainant’s organization was listed first in non-advertising rank, there was a substantial number of references to organizations, news reports, domain names and other listings that include “club soccer” as a descriptive term. The Panel does not consider this search to be ultimately determinative on the question whether Complainant might establish rights in US CLUB SOCCER as a service mark, but it was sufficient to persuade the Panel that Complainant has not here carried its burden of demonstrating that the terms are more than commonly descriptive or generic, given that the USPTO previously decided to that effect.

In light of these findings the Panel found as follows:

The rejection by the USPTO of Complainant’s application for registration on the Principal Register and Complainant’s conversion of that application to the Supplemental Register implies that its alleged service mark is not distinctive. The grounds of rejection by the USPTO expressly related to characteristics that may be understood to preclude the establishment of secondary meaning (i.e., primarily geographically descriptive term, generic-ness or mere description).

The Panel found that Complainant failed to establish the first element and thus did not address the other two elements. The Panel ordered the request for transfer be DENIED.

In the recent domain name dispute of L.F.P., Inc. and LFP IP, LLC v. Anthonny, Network Service (WIPO D2009-0984, September 13, 2009), a single member Panel was faced with a dispute over the domain www.hustlerlesbians.com. Complainant is the famous publisher of Hustler magazine and has many other ventures including videos and clothing under the HUSTLER mark. Complainant maintains a web site at www.hustler.com. The disputed domain was registered in September 2007 and the Respondent failed to respond to the complaint.

In accordance with Policy the Complainant must demonstrate that: (i) The disputed domain name is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the Complainant has rights; and (ii) The Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the disputed domain name; and (iii) The disputed domain name was registered and is being used by the Respondent in bad faith.

In addressing the first element, the Panel noted that L.F.P. (“Larry Flynt Productions”) had valid and long term trademark registrations for the HUSTLER mark. The Panel found that the disputed domain incorporated all of complainant’s mark including the generic word lesbians. The Panel explained:

The Complainant contends persuasively, and without contradiction from the Respondent, that a significant portion of the Complainant’s exploitation of adult entertainment products involves lesbian sexual activity. Ergo, the Panel concludes that a reasonable Internet user would find the similarity between the disputed domain name and the trademark confusing as to the source of the material found at the web site corresponding to the disputed domain name.

As a result, the Panel found Hustler satisfied this element. Moving to the second element, rights or legitimate interests, the Panel found that the disputed domain redirected users to adult material which competed directly with Hustler. The respondent did not make a bona fide offering of goods or services pursuant to the Policy. Additionally the Panel noted that Respondent was not commonly known by the disputed domain. For these reasons, the Panel found Hustler satisfied the second element.

Moving to the final element, bad faith, the Panel explained that HUSTLER has been well known throughout the world and the U.S. for years. The Panel held:

Furthermore, the Complainant has provided the Panel with acceptable visual evidence that the Respondent uses the disputed domain name for its web site that prompts Internet users to acquire material depicting lesbian sexual liaisons. Such material is a mainstay of the Complainant’s business, and the use of the Complainant’s full trademark as the first and dominant part of the disputed domain name compels the Panel to believe that the Respondent deliberately registered the name to confuse the public as to the source of said material for the Respondent’s commercial gain.

As a result, the Panel found that Complainant met all three elements and ordered the domain be TRANSFERRED.

In the recent domain name dispute decision of Shoe Zone Limited v. Moniker Privacy Services / DNS Admin (WIPO D2009-0946, September 2, 2009) a single member Panel was faced with a dispute over the domain www.shoezone.com. Complainant is a retailer and distributor of footwear throughout Ireland and the U.K. Complainant has multiple trademark registration, including one in the U.K. and a Community Trademark registration.  Complainant maintains a web site at www.shoezone.net. The disputed domain was registered in November 1998. According to the decision, the disputed domain has changed ownership at least three times since its original registration, with Respondent gaining ownership some time after June 2006. Complainant contends that sometime in May 2009 the disputed domain started to have advertising links to competitors of Complainant. Respondent failed to respond to the Complaint.

Under paragraph 4(a) of the Policy, a complainant has the burden of proving the following:(i) That the disputed domain name is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the complainant has rights; and (ii) That the respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the disputed domain name; and (iii) That the disputed domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.

The Panel simply and quickly found that the disputed domain was identical to the mark and that Complainant has rights through its registrations to the mark. Moving to the second element, whether the Respondent had any rights or legitimate interests in the domain, the Panel noted that Complainant made a sufficient prima facie case. The Panel found that there was no suggestion of authorization by Complainant, no evidence of “commonly known” by proof of Respondent, and that the use was clearly commercial through use of the sponsored links. The Panel thus found that Complainant satisfied the second element as well.

Moving to the final element, bad faith, the Panel noted that Respondent’s use of the domain as a landing page with sponsored links, without any explanation from Respondent, was sufficient proof of this element. The Panel also justified finding bad faith due to Respondent’s failure to respond and Respondent’s use of a privacy service.

Ultimately, the Panel found that Complainant had proved all three elements and ordered the domain be TRANSFERRED.

DefendMyDomain Commentary: Compare this case to the SHOE LAND case we previously blogged on (available here), Shoe Land Group LLC v. Development, Services c/o Telepathy Inc. (Nat. Arb Forum 1255365, June 9, 2009). Of course the facts are different, but one has to wonder whether a response by Respondent would have created a different outcome.

In the recent domain name dispute decision of Darren Entwistle, Telus Corporation v. Finian Commission (WIPO D2009-0961, September 1, 2009), a single member Panel was faced with a dispute over the domain www.darrenentwistle.com. Darren Entwistle is the President and CEO of TELUS, a leading national telecommunications company in Canada. TELUS provides a wide range of communications products and services including data, Internet protocol (IP), voice, entertainment and video and maintains a web site at www.telus.com. Respondent provided a response, but it is unclear from the decision how detailed it actually was.

Under 4(a) of the Policy, the Complainants must establish each of the following elements: (i) The disputed domain name is identical or confusingly similar to the trademark or service mark in which the Complainants have rights; (ii) The Respondent has no rights or legitimate interest in respect of the domain name; and (iii) The domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.

In addressing the first element, the Panel acknowledged that Mr. Entwistle does not have any federal trademark rights and instead needed to establish sufficient common law rights. The Panel  relied on the prior decision of Chung, Mong Koo and Hyundai Motor Company v. Individual, WIPO Case No. D2005-1068, which sets out six factors needed to establish a nexus between an individual’s name and its use and association in trade and commerce. They include:

1) the extent to which the commercial community identifies the individual with the company;
2) the extent to which the individual is seen by relevant media and sections of the public as the alter ego and driving force behind the company;
3) the extent of the personal ownership of the company by the individual;
4) the degree of personal control that the individual exercises over the enterprise;
5) the extent to which the individual is identified with any major achievements of the enterprise; and
6) whether the individual and/or the company has a demonstrable interest in protecting the individual’s name for commercial use.

The Panel then reviewed the evidence and found that Complainant sufficiently proved all of those six factors to show a nexus between Complainant and his company. AS a result, the Panel found that Complainant had shown sufficient common law rights, and finding that the domain was identical to the mark.

Moving to the second element, the Panel found that respondent was not known by the disputed domain. The Panel then relies on prior domain decisions which stood for the proposition that “it is not appropriate to use the name of the entity whom one wishes to criticize on the basis of ‘fair use’ to divert Internet traffic to the site.” The Panel seems to acknowledge that the disputed domain was used to criticize, but in the same respect it finds that since “the website at the disputed domain name also provides links to goods and services of third party entities for the purpose of monetary gain, the Respondent cannot be said to be making a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the domain name, without intent for commercial gain, paragraph 4(c)(iii) of the Policy.” Thus the Panel found that Complainant satisfied the second element as well.

Moving to the final element the Panel addresses Respondent contentions that this proceeding is an attempt at stifling free speech through censorship. The Panel, relying on three prior decisions, explains that the one may be entitled to criticism, but not when it is using a domain which is identical to someone’s trademark. Regardless, the Panel notes that use of the domain to denigrate Complainant, while having commercial links on the same web site cannot be found to be pure criticism.

Ultimately, the Panel found that Complainant satisfied all three elements and ordered the domain be TRANSFERRED.

In the recent domain name dispute decision of Davidoff & Cie SA v. Nicaragua Tobacco Imports, Inc. / Jorge Salazar (WIPO D2009-0923 August 20, 2009), a single member Panel was faced with a dispute over the domains www.davidoffcigarcutter.com, www.davidoffhumidor.com and www.davidoffhumidors.com. Complainant is the well known tobacco products company with a presence for nearly 100 years. They maintain a web site at www.davidoff.com. Respondent failed to respond to the complaint. Complainant has numerous trademark registrations for the DAVIDOFF mark.

The Panel provided one of the shortest decisions yet.  First, the Panel found that the domain names all incorporated Complainant’s full mark with the addition of generic words related to Complainant’s business. Second, the Panel found that there was no evidence of any right or legitimate interest in the domain by Respondent. Lastly, the Panel addressed the issue of bad faith. The Panel found that due to the long existence of Complainant and its use of the marks, the disputed domains could only have been registered in bad faith. Many of the links on the pages of the domains led to links of direct competitors with Complainant.

Ultimately, the Panel found that Complainant satisfied all elements of the Policy and ordered the domain be TRANSFERRED.