In the recent cybersquatting case of Digital Alchemy, LLC v. Digital Alchemy c/o Ramon Felciano FA1295928 (Nat. Arb. Forum, January 12, 2010) a single member Panel was faced with a dispute over the domain www.DigitalAlchemy.com. Complainant operates in the field of electronic CRM for the Hospitality Industry and maintains a web site at www.data2gold.com. Complainant claims no registered trademark but states it has common law rights dating back to 1996.  Respondent is a consulting firm based in San Francisco, California, specializing in business, product, and technology strategy for life sciences, healthcare and technology markets. Respondent claims to have been offering its consulting services since 1993.

Paragraph 4(a) of the ICANN UDRP Policy requires that the Complainant must prove each of the following three elements to obtain an order that a domain name should be cancelled or transferred: (1) the domain name registered by the Respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the Complainant has rights; (2) the Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and (3) the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.

In addressing the first element, the Panel noted that the disputed domain is identical to the DIGITAL ALCHEMY mark. But the Panel found that Complainant failed to demonstrate it has rights to the mark. The Panel criticized the Complainant’s contention that it had used the mark in connection with its services since 1996, noting that it was a conclusory statement lacking sufficient evidence. The Panel further finds that Complainant failed to present evidence of secondary meaning. The Panel cited to another prior decision and explained.

 In declining to recognize the complainant’s common law mark in Kip Cashmore the panel stated:  “Here, Complainant has not presented any credible evidence establishing acquired distinctiveness [for the complainant’s goods and services]. The record is devoid of any declarations of unaffiliated parties attesting that the mark of Complainant serves as an identifier of origin or services. Complainant’s record consists of merely a declaration of Complainant with unsupported facts…” Here the record is even more paltry than in Kip Cashmore, as there isn’t even a self-serving declaration by Complainant that its mark serves as an identifier of its goods and services in the public’s mind.

Moving to the second element, the Panel continued its analysis. The Panel found Complainant failed to present a prima facie case. Respondent presented evidence of doing business since 1993 under the Digital Alchemy name, which was prior to Complainant’s use. The Panel dismissed Complainant’s Additional Submission argument that there was no proof of continuos use by Respondent, noting the UDRP had no such requirement. The Panel also dismissed Complainant’s contention that the offer to sell the domain, after being solicited by Complainant did not satisfy this element.

In addressing the final element, bad faith, the Panel explained:

Given Respondent’s use of the Digital Alchemy name in its business since 1993, and the Panel’s finding that Respondent has rights and legitimate interests in the domain name, the Panel concludes that Respondent did not register and is not using the domain in bad faith. Indeed, as prior panels have held, once a panel has determined that a respondent has rights and legitimate interests in a domain name, the question of bad faith is moot.

Ultimately, the Panel found that Complainant failed to prove any of the three elements, and DENIED the request for transfer.

In the recent cybersquatting action JetPay, LLC v. JetyPayments FA1294887 (Nat. Arb. Forum, January 6, 2010) a single member Panel was faced with a dispute over the domain www.jetypay.com. Complainant offers credit card and check authorization processing services since 2000 and maintains a web site a www.jetpay.com. Complainant holds a trademark registration for the JETPAY mark. Respondent registered the disputed domain in December 2007 and failed to respond to the complaint.

Paragraph 4(a) of the ICANN UDRP Policy requires that Complainant must prove each of the following three elements to obtain an order that a domain name should be cancelled or transferred: (1) the domain name registered by Respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which Complainant has rights; and (2) Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and (3) the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.

In addressing the first element, the Panel noted that Complainant established its rights in the JETPAY mark pursuant to the Policy. Additionally, the Panel found that Complainant provided sufficient evidence of common law rights and secondary meaning for the mark dating back to 2000. A comparison of the mark with the disputed domain showed that Respondent merely added the letter “y” in the middle. As a result, the Panel found this to be confusingly similar.

Moving to the second element, the Panel explained that Complainant set forth a prima facie case, shifting the burden to Respondent. Interstingly the Panel found that although Respondent appeared to be commonly known by the disputed domain, it still lacked rights and legitimate interests in the domain. The Panel explained that Respondnet’s use of the domain, namely selling goods or services similar to Complainant’s was not a bona fide offering nor a legitimate noncommerical use. As a result, the Panel noted Complainant satisfied this element.

The last element, bad faith, was also favorable to Complainant. The Panel explained the disputed domain linked internet users to a website offering similar products and services as those of Complainant. This was found to be bad faith under the Policy. Additionally, the use of a confusingly similar domain name to attract users for profit, creates a strong likelihood of confusion, thus also being bad faith.

Ultimately, the Panel found that Complainant satisfied all three elements and ordered the domain be TRANSFERRED.

In the recent domain name dispute decision of Hargrave Arts LLC c/o Carter Hargrave v. Chiefasian LLC c/o Martin Eng FA1294273 (Nat. Arb. Forum, December 31, 2009), a single member Panel was faced with a dispute over the domain www.jeetkunedo.com. Complainant is the owner of multiple Jeet Kune Do related domains, including www.jeetkunedo.net and www.jeetkunedo.org. Mr. Hargrave is the president of the World Jeet Kune Do Federation. He claims common law trademark rights to the mark JEET KUNE DO. A little background is necessary, for an understanding of the origins of JEET KUNE DO. This form of martial arts was founded by Bruce Lee in the late 1960’s. According to the decision, Complainant is one of about 50 certified instructors. The disputed domain was registered on March 6, 2000 and Respondent provided a response to the complaint.  Although the Response was not provided the Panel noted that Respondent claims Hargrave does not have rights to the JEET KUNE DO mark.

Paragraph 4(a) of the ICANN UDRP Policy requires that the Complainant must prove each of the following three elements to obtain an order that a domain name should be cancelled or transferred: (1) the domain name registered by the Respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the Complainant has rights; (2) the Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and (3) the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.

The Panel addressed the first element explaining that Complainaint contends he acquired rights to the JEET KUNE DO mark from Bruce Lee and the Bruce Lee Jeet Kune DO School. However, the Panel notes that Hargrave fails to provide any evidence that it represents Bruce Lee or the Bruce Lee School. Additionally, Hargrave fails to provide any evidence that any of the rights to the JEET KUNE DO mark were assigned or licensed to him. For these reasons, the Panel found that Hargrave did not satisfy the first element.

The Panel did not review the remaining elements and DENIED the request for transfer.

In the recent domain name dispute decision of Microsoft Corporation v. Doug Goodman FA1294422 (Nat. Arb. Forum, December 31, 2009) a single member Panel was faced with a dispute over 21 separate domains containing the mark BING. Microsoft needs no introduction and maintains many web sites for its business, the most relevant in this case being, www.bing.com. The disputed domains were registered during a three day period of June 24, 2009 through June 26, 2009. Respondent provided a response to the dispute, and gave some colorful defenses, which included:

1.    Respondent “created of formulated” the disputed domain names that had been missed by “Microsoft webmasters” until Respondent offered them to Complainant.
2.      The disputed domain names would bring value to the Complainant and the Complainant should pay for them.
3.      Respondent concedes that each of the names has BING in them and that BING is a pending mark
4.      The domain names were not registered in bad faith because Respondent had no intent to harm BING, Inc.
5.      Respondent does not use the disputed domain names to divert users from BING, Inc.
6.      Because of the value the disputed names will bring to Complainant, the case should be viewed as a case of reverse name highjacking

Paragraph 4(a) of the ICANN UDRP Policy requires Complainant to prove each of the following three elements to obtain an order that a domain name should be cancelled or transferred: (1) the domain name registered by the Respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the Complainant has rights; (2) Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and (3) the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.

In addressing the first element, Microsoft noted that it does not have any registered BING marks yet, but did file for multiple BING related trademarks in March 2009. The Panel noted that Microsoft need not have a trademark registration and can show that it has common law rights to the mark. Microsoft presented evidence that it has continuously used the BING mark since May 28, 2008 and that a previous UDRP Panel found that it had established its rights to the mark. As a result, the Panel reviewed the disputed domains and found that they were confusingly similar to the BING mark. Interestingly, as the Panel explained, Respondent concedes that he intentionally put the BING mark in the domains and was fully aware of Microsoft’s interest in the mark. The Panel found Microsoft satisfied this element.

Moving to the second element, the Panel noted that Microsoft put forth a prima facie case, shifting the burden of argument to Respondent. The Panel noted that Respondent was not commonly known by the disputed domain. Additionally, the Panel found that four (4) of the domains led users to a web site with third party hyperlinks, some of which compete with Microsoft. The Panel found that this was not a bona fide offering of services. Regarding the remaining 17 domains, the Panel noted that they redirected the user to Microsoft’s BING.com web site. The Panel explained that Respondent admitted his primary intention in registering these domains was to sell them to Microsoft. Offering to sell the domains is also not considered a bona fide use. The Panel found that Microsoft satisfied this element.

Moving to the final element, bad faith, the Panel noted that the Respondent attempted to sell the domains for more then his out-of-pocket expenses. This factor is considered bad faith. Additionally, the four domains which landed on parked pages, also were a showing of bad faith, since they likely resulted in click-through fees for Respondent. The Panel found Microsoft satisfied this element as well.

The Panel quickly dispensed with Respondent’s reverse domain name hijacking argument and found that since Microsoft had proved all three elements, it ordered all 21 domains be TRANSFERRED.

In the recent domain name dispute decision of Kim Laube & Company Inc. v. RareNames, WebReg FA1291282 (Nat. Arb. Forum December 22, 2009) a three member Panel was faced with a dispute over the domains www.natureschoice.com and www.natures-choice.com. Complainant sells pet grooming products and has a a trademark registration for the mark NATURE’S CHOICE. Respondent provided a response to the complaint and registered the disputed domains in 2002 and 2003.

Policy ¶ 4(a) of the ICANN UDRP rules requires that Complainant must prove each of the following three elements to obtain an order that the domain names should be cancelled or transferred: 1. the domain names registered by Respondent are identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which Complainant has rights; 2. Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain names; and 3. the domain names have been registered and is being used in bad faith.

The Panel addressed the first element of the analysis and explained that the domains were identical or confusingly similar to Complainant’s mark. Although Respondent argued that Complainant could not hold exclusive rights on the common words, the Panel dismissed this argument under this prong of analysis.

The Panel declined to address the second prong, directing its attention to the third prong. First the Panel noted that there was no evidence presented that Respondent’s registered the domains primarily for the purpose of disrupting Complainant’s business.  The Panel only paid serious attention to Policy ¶4(b)(i) and (iv). Those sections state:

For the purposes of Paragraph 4(a)(iii), the following circumstances, in particular but without limitation, if found by the Panel to be present, shall be evidence of the registration and use of a domain name in bad faith:

(i) circumstances indicating that you have registered or you have acquired the domain name primarily for the purpose of selling, renting, or otherwise transferring the domain name registration to the complainant who is the owner of the trademark or service mark or to a competitor of that complainant, for valuable consideration in excess of your documented out-of-pocket costs directly related to the domain name; or…

(iv) by using the domain name, you have intentionally attempted to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to your web site or other on-line location, by creating a likelihood of confusion with the complainant’s mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of your web site or location or of a product or service on your web site or location.

The Panel explained as follows:

Turning first to Policy ¶ 4(b)(i), Respondent states that its business is the acquisition then sale of domain names for profit.  The only important issue is whether Complainant can point to circumstances indicating that Respondent registered the names primarily for the purpose of selling, renting, or otherwise transferring the domain name registration to Complainant or to a competitor of Complainant.

Likewise, Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv) requires proof that Respondent for commercial gain; intentionally used the disputed domain name to attract web users; to an on-line location; by creating a likelihood of confusion with Complainant’s trademark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of that on-line location, or of a product or service at that location.

Once more, the key issue is whether Respondent can be said to have used the domain names in a way which intentionally created a likelihood of confusion with Complainant’s trademark.

The Panel recognized that there are other contrary decisions on this topic but noted that their view was that “proof of actual knowledge of a Complianant’s trademark rights is necessary.” The Panel explained that in the situations where there is a trademark with descriptive elements, then the onus rises on proof of knowledge. The Panel discounts the arguments put forth by Complainant of its common law rights, based on a lack of evidentiary support. The Panel concluded by noting:

Taking account of the inherently descriptive character of both the trademark and the disputed domain name, the degree to which either very similar domain names or identical domain names with different extensions have been registered/used by others, the lack of evidence that Respondent has habitually abused third party trademark rights, and all of the circumstances, the Panel finds that neither Policy ¶ 4(b) (i) or (iv) is made out.

Ultimately, the Panel found that Complainant had failed to prove up all three elements, and DENIED the request for transfer.

In the recent domain name dispute decision of Life Extension Foundation, Inc. v. PHD Prime Health Direct Limited (FA1289603, Nat. Arb. Forum, November 25, 2009) a three member Panel agreed to transfer the domain www.lifeextensionfoundation.com to Complainant. Life Extension Foundation maintains web sites at www.lef.org and www.lifeextension.com. As their web site states:

The Life Extension Foundation is the world’s largest organization dedicated to finding scientific methods for addressing disease, aging, and death. The Life Extension Foundation is a non-profit group that funds pioneering scientific research aimed at achieving an indefinitely extended healthy human lifespan. The fruits of this research are used to develop novel disease prevention and treatment protocols.

 Our law firm represented Life Extension Foundation in this dispute, so we will refrain from providing our normal commentary. If you would like to know more details please read the decision (here).

In the recent domain name dispute decision of Bin Shabib & Associates (BSA) LLP v. Hebei IT Shanghai ltd c/o Domain Administrator FA1287164 (Nat. Arb. Forum, November 19, 2009), a three member Panel was faced with a dispute over the domain www.bsa.com. Complainant is a law firm which operates in the United Arab Emirates and maintains a website at www.bsa.ae. Complainant claims rights to the BSA mark since based on two different dates, 2001 and 2007. Complainant filed for a trademark in the UAE, but has not yet received a registration. Respondent provided a Response, including an additional submission. The Panel noted that the Response was deficient for not being timely, but concluded to review the materials regardless.

Paragraph 4(a) of the ICANN UDRP Policy requires that the Complainant must prove each of the following three elements to obtain an order that a domain name should be cancelled or transferred: (1) the domain name registered by the Respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the Complainant has rights; (2) the Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and (3) the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.

In addressing the first element, the Panel explained:

The Panel finds that Complainant has failed to establish registered trademark rights or common law rights in the BSA mark. Specifically, Complainant’s use of the BSA mark for less than two years has been too short, and Complainant has not shown any evidence of the sort that is usually used to establish that a mark has acquired secondary meaning. In light of Respondent’s arguments, the Panel finds that Complainant has failed to establish common law rights in the BSA mark pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(a)(i)….Having found that Complainant has not satisfied Policy ¶ 4(a)(i) because it has failed to establish rights in the mark, the Panel declines to analyze the other two elements of the Policy.

The Panel was not finished though, since it then addressed the issue of Reverse Domain Name Hijacking.

The panel finds that Complainant has failed to present any evidence to support its claimed rights in the disputed domain name. It only provided an application for trademark registration which does not establish any enforceable rights under the UDRP. It did not offer any evidence to support a finding of common law rights in the disputed mark. Also, the Panel finds that Complainant knew or should have known that it was unable to prove that Respondent lacks rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name or that Respondent registered and is using the disputed domain name in bad faith. Based on the foregoing, the panel finds that reverse domain name hijacking has occurred.

In light of the following, the Panel DENIED Complainant’s request to transfer the domain. and made a finding of reverse domain name hijacking.

For anyone following UDRP cases, this one was highly anticipated. The case of Mercury Radio Arts, Inc. and Glenn Beck v. Isaac Eiland-Hall (WIPO D2009-1182, October 29, 2009) dealt with the domain www.glennbeckrapedandmurderedayounggirlin1990.com. (For all the case filings and opinion please go here.) If you don’t know anything about this case you should read the full decision to get an understanding of the UDRP process. It seems as though Mr. Beck got a taste of his own rhetoric today, but if you want to know more about him visit his web site at www.glennbeck.com. Our friend Marc Randazza has won another case with some very “eloquent” language in his pleadings and has provided many First Amendment proponents with a significant case for later use.

Essentially, the Panel found that the domain was confusingly similar to Mr. Beck’s trademark. The case turned on the issue of whether the domain was being used in a manner consistent with the First Amendment rights to publish satyrical content. The Panel believed that the disputed domain was a parody and should be afforded such protection. The Panel explained:

It can be and has been argued by Complainant that the disputed domain name should be assessed “standing alone” because at least some Internet viewers will only have that first impression (i.e., they will not click through).  However, this case involves a form of speech arguably strongly protected under the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.  This Panel is very reluctant to reject Respondent’s claim of legitimate noncommercial and fair use on the distinction between viewing of the disputed domain name itself and clicking through to Respondent’s website.  On the same basis by which the Panel has determined the disputed domain name is confusingly similar to Complainant’s trademark – that is, Internet users viewing the disputed domain name will be curious and motivated to visit the website – the Panel also considers that Respondent’s speech should be assessed as a whole, both by reference to the disputed domain name and the content of Respondent’s website (i.e., on the assumption the preponderance of Internet users will indeed click through).

The Panel did not address any issues of bad faith since they found that there was legitimate rights involved. The Panel stated “The Panel notes, however, that the combination of political speech engaged in by Respondent and the substantial lack of commercial intent makes it unlikely to this Panel that Complainant would have succeeded in demonstrating bad faith registration and use.”
A large tip of the hat goes out to Mr. Randazza for a great win.

Update: The Respondent pulled a fast one on Mr. Beck and relinquished the domain. See his letter to Beck (here)

In the recent domain name dispute decision of Ashley Judd v. Alberta Hot Rods, Jeff Burgar (WIPO D2009-1099, September 25, 2009), a single member Panel was faced with a dispute over the domain www.ashleyjudd.com. Judd is the well known actress who has appeared in countless film and television roles throughout the 1990’s and 2000’s. Respondent registered the disputed domain in 1996 and failed to reply to the Complaint.

In accordance with paragraph 4(a) of the Policy, in order to succeed in this proceeding, the Complainant must prove (i) that the Domain Name is identical or confusingly similar to a mark in which she has rights; (ii) that the Respondents have no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the Domain Name; and (iii) that the Domain Name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.

In addressing the first element, the Panel noted that Judd had common law rights in her name.

It is well-established that where an actor has a sufficient reputation for her professional work under her name or stage name, that name is a marke in which she has rights for the purpose of the UDRP: see, for example, Julia Fiona Roberts v. Russell Boyd, WIPO Case No. D2000-0210. The Panel finds on the evidence that the Complainant has amply sufficient reputation to satisfy this requirement. As a result, the Panel found the Judd satisfied the first element.

Moving to the second element, the Panel found that Respondent had failed to use the domain in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services. Instead the panel found that the disputed domain was used to drive traffic to another web site with the intention of obtaining revenue from sponsored links. The Panel also found that Respondent was not commonly known by the disputed domain.

Moving to the final element, bad faith, the Panel noted that Judd’s reputation as an actress had been well established by 1996. Additionally, the Panel found that Respondent engaged in a pattern of registering domain containing names of famous actors and celebrities. The Panel declined to apply any possible defense of laches. Ultimately, the Panel found that there was no contrary evidence and concluded that Judd satisfied all the elements. The Panel ordered the domain be TRANSFERRED.

In the recent domain name decision of National Association of Competitive Soccer Clubs v. Bruce Binler (WIPO, D2009-0957, September 7, 2009), a single member panel was faced with a dispute over the domain www.usclubsoccer.net. Complainant is a non-for profit organization responsible for putting together soccer clubs, leagues and tournaments across the U.S. Complainant maintains a web site at www.usclubsoccer.org and has a servicemark registration for US CLUB SOCCER. Respondent registered the domain in 2007 and failed to provide a response to the Complaint.

Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy sets forth three elements that must be established by a complainant to merit a finding that a respondent has engaged in abusive domain name registration and use, and to obtain relief. These elements are that: (i) respondent’s domain name is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the complainant has rights; and (ii) respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and (iii) respondent’s domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.

Some of the facts presented included that Respondent used the domain in connection with promoting soccer events sanctioned by Complainant in 2006 and 2007.These facts may have been relevant in the Panel’s findings, however, the Panel did not make it passed the first element.

The Panel found that Complainant did not establish sufficient rights in the mark US CLUB SOCCER. The Panel noted that Complainant’s citation to a federal registration failed to inform the Panel that it was actually on the Supplemental Register.

Complainant does not enjoy a presumption of service mark rights based on registration of US CLUB SOCCER on the Supplemental Register of the USPTO. Complainant does not enjoy any presumption of rights based on the submission of a recent application for registration of the same term on the Principal Register of the USPTO.

Although Complainant has recently applied again to the USPTO for the same mark seeking registration on the Principal Register. Therefore, the Panel noted that Complainant must show that it had sufficient common law rights. The Panel was concerned that the USPTO rejected the original application for being primarily geographically descriptive with terms that are generic or merely descriptive. The Panel took some liberties in doing some market reserach and made the following observations:

Critically however, Complainant did not address the question whether the terms are commonly descriptive or generic. In the interests of fairness, the Panel performed Google and Bing searches for CLUB SOCCER together. Those searches returned many millions of “hits”. While Complainant’s organization was listed first in non-advertising rank, there was a substantial number of references to organizations, news reports, domain names and other listings that include “club soccer” as a descriptive term. The Panel does not consider this search to be ultimately determinative on the question whether Complainant might establish rights in US CLUB SOCCER as a service mark, but it was sufficient to persuade the Panel that Complainant has not here carried its burden of demonstrating that the terms are more than commonly descriptive or generic, given that the USPTO previously decided to that effect.

In light of these findings the Panel found as follows:

The rejection by the USPTO of Complainant’s application for registration on the Principal Register and Complainant’s conversion of that application to the Supplemental Register implies that its alleged service mark is not distinctive. The grounds of rejection by the USPTO expressly related to characteristics that may be understood to preclude the establishment of secondary meaning (i.e., primarily geographically descriptive term, generic-ness or mere description).

The Panel found that Complainant failed to establish the first element and thus did not address the other two elements. The Panel ordered the request for transfer be DENIED.