In the recent cybersquatting decision of CruiseShipCenters International Inc. v. Leonard Brody FA1297509 (Nat. Arb. Forum February 10, 2010) a single member Panel was faced with a dispute over the domain www.cruiseshipcenters.mobi. Complainant maintains a web site at www.cruiseshipcenters.com, which appears to be run in connection with Expedia. Respondent registered the disputed domain name on November 9, 2006.  The disputed domain name does not resolve to an active website. 

Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy requires that Complainant must prove each of the following three elements to obtain an order that a domain name should be cancelled or transferred: (1) the domain name registered by Respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which Complainant has rights; and (2) Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and (3) the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.

The Panel noted that Complainant had registered marks for CRUISESHIPCENTERS with Canada, the European Union and the U.S., which all were registered in early 2008. In addressing the first element, the Panel found that the registrations were enough to prove complainant’s rights in the mark. As a result the Panel found that the disputed domain was identical to Complainant’s mark. The Panel declined to review the second element in light of its findings from the third element.

The Panel explained that although Complainant proved its rights in the mark, none of the registrations predated the November 2006 registration date of the disputed domain. The Complainant failed to provide any evidence showing common law rights which may have predated the domain registration. For these reasons, the Panel found Respondent did not register the disputed domain in bad faith. Ultimately, the Panel ruled that the request for transfer be DENIED.

Inter-Continental Hotels Corporation and Six Continents Hotels, Inc. decided that one man’s ownership of 1,542 domains was just too much to bear. In the recent cybersquatting decision of Inter-Continental Hotels Corporation, Six Continents Hotels, Inc. v. Daniel Kirchhof (WIPO Case No. D2009-1661, January 19, 2010) a single member panel had the long task of sorting through these domains. For a full listing of all the domains in dispute please see the decision.

Paragraph 4(a) of the ICANN UDRP Policy provides that a complainant must prove each of the following: (i) that the disputed domain name is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or a service mark in which the complainant has rights; and (ii) that the respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name; and (iii) that the disputed domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.

Complainants are the well known corporate owners of multiple hotel chains which include, Holiday Inn, Holiday Inn Express, Intercontinental, Crowne Plaza, Staybridge Suites, Staybridge, Hotel Indigo, Candlewood, and Candlewood Suites. For more info about Complainants go to www.ichotelsgroup.com or www.ihg.com .

The Panel, in addressing the first element noted that most of the domain names included Complainants’ trademarks with the addition of some geographic indicator. Thus the domains were found to be identical or confusingly similar. The Panel also found that many of the domains contained Complainants’ trademarks and a descriptive term. These were also determined to be confusingly similar. The Panel further found that many of the disputed domain names started with part of the Complainant’s trademark in combination with a geographic location or generic term. These were also found to be confusingly similar. However, a total of ten (10) of the disputed domain names were found to not be confusingly similar to any of Complainant’s trademarks.

The Panel quickly dealt with the second element noting:

The websites resolving from the disputed domain names create the impression that they are official websites for the relevant hotel, or potentially, that the Respondent manages the hotel. By using the Complainant’s trade marks, the Respondent is falsely suggesting he is the trade mark owner or the website is the official site for the accommodation of the Complainant’s related entities when it is not…. Accordingly, the Panel concludes that the Respondent intentionally selected domain names which contained the Complainant’s trade marks, and added a word or words which do not serve to distinguish them, but which strengthens the association with the Complainant or its goods and services, for the purpose of redirecting Internet users to his own websites. Such use cannot constitute a bona fide offering of goods of services.

Although previous domain dispute decisions have an effect on a finding of bad faith, Respondent’s lack of previous decisions didn’t sway the Panel.

The Respondent has not been named as a respondent in previous UDRP decisions. However the fact that this proceeding has been brought in relation to over 1,500 domain names which contain the Complainant’s trade marks, makes it clear that the Respondent has engaged in a pattern of registering domain names in order to prevent a trade mark owner from reflecting their mark in a corresponding domain name. The Panel’s view is further supported by the fact that the Respondent owns a vast array of other domain names. This is clear evidence of bad faith.

Ultimately, the Panel agreed that 1,519 of the domains should be TRANSFERRED. There was a remaining 23 domains, of which 13 with withdrawn and 10 were DENIED.

In the recent cybersquatting case of Digital Alchemy, LLC v. Digital Alchemy c/o Ramon Felciano FA1295928 (Nat. Arb. Forum, January 12, 2010) a single member Panel was faced with a dispute over the domain www.DigitalAlchemy.com. Complainant operates in the field of electronic CRM for the Hospitality Industry and maintains a web site at www.data2gold.com. Complainant claims no registered trademark but states it has common law rights dating back to 1996.  Respondent is a consulting firm based in San Francisco, California, specializing in business, product, and technology strategy for life sciences, healthcare and technology markets. Respondent claims to have been offering its consulting services since 1993.

Paragraph 4(a) of the ICANN UDRP Policy requires that the Complainant must prove each of the following three elements to obtain an order that a domain name should be cancelled or transferred: (1) the domain name registered by the Respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the Complainant has rights; (2) the Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and (3) the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.

In addressing the first element, the Panel noted that the disputed domain is identical to the DIGITAL ALCHEMY mark. But the Panel found that Complainant failed to demonstrate it has rights to the mark. The Panel criticized the Complainant’s contention that it had used the mark in connection with its services since 1996, noting that it was a conclusory statement lacking sufficient evidence. The Panel further finds that Complainant failed to present evidence of secondary meaning. The Panel cited to another prior decision and explained.

 In declining to recognize the complainant’s common law mark in Kip Cashmore the panel stated:  “Here, Complainant has not presented any credible evidence establishing acquired distinctiveness [for the complainant’s goods and services]. The record is devoid of any declarations of unaffiliated parties attesting that the mark of Complainant serves as an identifier of origin or services. Complainant’s record consists of merely a declaration of Complainant with unsupported facts…” Here the record is even more paltry than in Kip Cashmore, as there isn’t even a self-serving declaration by Complainant that its mark serves as an identifier of its goods and services in the public’s mind.

Moving to the second element, the Panel continued its analysis. The Panel found Complainant failed to present a prima facie case. Respondent presented evidence of doing business since 1993 under the Digital Alchemy name, which was prior to Complainant’s use. The Panel dismissed Complainant’s Additional Submission argument that there was no proof of continuos use by Respondent, noting the UDRP had no such requirement. The Panel also dismissed Complainant’s contention that the offer to sell the domain, after being solicited by Complainant did not satisfy this element.

In addressing the final element, bad faith, the Panel explained:

Given Respondent’s use of the Digital Alchemy name in its business since 1993, and the Panel’s finding that Respondent has rights and legitimate interests in the domain name, the Panel concludes that Respondent did not register and is not using the domain in bad faith. Indeed, as prior panels have held, once a panel has determined that a respondent has rights and legitimate interests in a domain name, the question of bad faith is moot.

Ultimately, the Panel found that Complainant failed to prove any of the three elements, and DENIED the request for transfer.

In the recent domain name dispute decision of Hargrave Arts LLC c/o Carter Hargrave v. Chiefasian LLC c/o Martin Eng FA1294273 (Nat. Arb. Forum, December 31, 2009), a single member Panel was faced with a dispute over the domain www.jeetkunedo.com. Complainant is the owner of multiple Jeet Kune Do related domains, including www.jeetkunedo.net and www.jeetkunedo.org. Mr. Hargrave is the president of the World Jeet Kune Do Federation. He claims common law trademark rights to the mark JEET KUNE DO. A little background is necessary, for an understanding of the origins of JEET KUNE DO. This form of martial arts was founded by Bruce Lee in the late 1960’s. According to the decision, Complainant is one of about 50 certified instructors. The disputed domain was registered on March 6, 2000 and Respondent provided a response to the complaint.  Although the Response was not provided the Panel noted that Respondent claims Hargrave does not have rights to the JEET KUNE DO mark.

Paragraph 4(a) of the ICANN UDRP Policy requires that the Complainant must prove each of the following three elements to obtain an order that a domain name should be cancelled or transferred: (1) the domain name registered by the Respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the Complainant has rights; (2) the Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and (3) the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.

The Panel addressed the first element explaining that Complainaint contends he acquired rights to the JEET KUNE DO mark from Bruce Lee and the Bruce Lee Jeet Kune DO School. However, the Panel notes that Hargrave fails to provide any evidence that it represents Bruce Lee or the Bruce Lee School. Additionally, Hargrave fails to provide any evidence that any of the rights to the JEET KUNE DO mark were assigned or licensed to him. For these reasons, the Panel found that Hargrave did not satisfy the first element.

The Panel did not review the remaining elements and DENIED the request for transfer.

In the recent domain name dispute decision of Kim Laube & Company Inc. v. RareNames, WebReg FA1291282 (Nat. Arb. Forum December 22, 2009) a three member Panel was faced with a dispute over the domains www.natureschoice.com and www.natures-choice.com. Complainant sells pet grooming products and has a a trademark registration for the mark NATURE’S CHOICE. Respondent provided a response to the complaint and registered the disputed domains in 2002 and 2003.

Policy ¶ 4(a) of the ICANN UDRP rules requires that Complainant must prove each of the following three elements to obtain an order that the domain names should be cancelled or transferred: 1. the domain names registered by Respondent are identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which Complainant has rights; 2. Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain names; and 3. the domain names have been registered and is being used in bad faith.

The Panel addressed the first element of the analysis and explained that the domains were identical or confusingly similar to Complainant’s mark. Although Respondent argued that Complainant could not hold exclusive rights on the common words, the Panel dismissed this argument under this prong of analysis.

The Panel declined to address the second prong, directing its attention to the third prong. First the Panel noted that there was no evidence presented that Respondent’s registered the domains primarily for the purpose of disrupting Complainant’s business.  The Panel only paid serious attention to Policy ¶4(b)(i) and (iv). Those sections state:

For the purposes of Paragraph 4(a)(iii), the following circumstances, in particular but without limitation, if found by the Panel to be present, shall be evidence of the registration and use of a domain name in bad faith:

(i) circumstances indicating that you have registered or you have acquired the domain name primarily for the purpose of selling, renting, or otherwise transferring the domain name registration to the complainant who is the owner of the trademark or service mark or to a competitor of that complainant, for valuable consideration in excess of your documented out-of-pocket costs directly related to the domain name; or…

(iv) by using the domain name, you have intentionally attempted to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to your web site or other on-line location, by creating a likelihood of confusion with the complainant’s mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of your web site or location or of a product or service on your web site or location.

The Panel explained as follows:

Turning first to Policy ¶ 4(b)(i), Respondent states that its business is the acquisition then sale of domain names for profit.  The only important issue is whether Complainant can point to circumstances indicating that Respondent registered the names primarily for the purpose of selling, renting, or otherwise transferring the domain name registration to Complainant or to a competitor of Complainant.

Likewise, Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv) requires proof that Respondent for commercial gain; intentionally used the disputed domain name to attract web users; to an on-line location; by creating a likelihood of confusion with Complainant’s trademark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of that on-line location, or of a product or service at that location.

Once more, the key issue is whether Respondent can be said to have used the domain names in a way which intentionally created a likelihood of confusion with Complainant’s trademark.

The Panel recognized that there are other contrary decisions on this topic but noted that their view was that “proof of actual knowledge of a Complianant’s trademark rights is necessary.” The Panel explained that in the situations where there is a trademark with descriptive elements, then the onus rises on proof of knowledge. The Panel discounts the arguments put forth by Complainant of its common law rights, based on a lack of evidentiary support. The Panel concluded by noting:

Taking account of the inherently descriptive character of both the trademark and the disputed domain name, the degree to which either very similar domain names or identical domain names with different extensions have been registered/used by others, the lack of evidence that Respondent has habitually abused third party trademark rights, and all of the circumstances, the Panel finds that neither Policy ¶ 4(b) (i) or (iv) is made out.

Ultimately, the Panel found that Complainant had failed to prove up all three elements, and DENIED the request for transfer.

In the recent domain name dispute decision of Greatwater, Inc. v. Greatwater Custom Label (2004) Inc FA1287920 (Nat. Arb. Forum November 25, 2009) a single member Panel was faced with a dispute over the domains www.greatwater.com and www.nationwidesprings.com. Complainant is the supplier of private label bottled water. Complainant originally registered the greatwater.com domain and its parent company purchased the nationwidesprings.com domain. Complainant’s company was sold to a third party company, who in turn sold it to a fourth company. That fourth company supposed then sold it to a fifth company, but started their own new bottled water business (Respondent) in competition with Complainant. That competition included Respondent maintaining control of and using the two disputed domains. Respondent argues that Complainant has failed to show it has any trademark rights, and challenges that Complainant has not established secondary meaning.

Paragraph 4(a) of the ICANN UDRP Policy requires that the Complainant must prove each of the following three elements to obtain an order that a domain name should be cancelled or transferred: (1) the domain name registered by the Respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the Complainant has rights; (2) the Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and (3) the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.

In addressing the first element, the Panel found that Complainant failed to establish common law rights through secondary meaning of either domain name. Although the Complainant failed to prove the first element the Panel chose to review all of the elements.

Moving to the second element, the Panel found that Complainant failed to present a prima facie case in support of its arguments.

Respondent presents evidence and argues that it has used the disputed domain names in connection with its business selling bottled water since its incorporation in 2004. The Panel finds that Respondent has made demonstrable use the disputed domain names in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c)(i)….Respondent argues that Respondent has been commonly known by the disputed domain names since its incorporation in 2004 for the business of selling bottled water. The Panel finds that Respondent has rights and legitimate interests in the disputed domain names due to it being commonly known by the disputed domain names pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii).

The Panel moved to the final element, bad faith, noting that Complainant did not present sufficient evidence. The Panel concluded that since Respondent had rights or legitimate interests in the domains, they had also not registered the domains in bad faith.

Ultimately, the Panel DENIED Complainant’s request to transfer the domains.

In the recent domain name dispute decision of Bin Shabib & Associates (BSA) LLP v. Hebei IT Shanghai ltd c/o Domain Administrator FA1287164 (Nat. Arb. Forum, November 19, 2009), a three member Panel was faced with a dispute over the domain www.bsa.com. Complainant is a law firm which operates in the United Arab Emirates and maintains a website at www.bsa.ae. Complainant claims rights to the BSA mark since based on two different dates, 2001 and 2007. Complainant filed for a trademark in the UAE, but has not yet received a registration. Respondent provided a Response, including an additional submission. The Panel noted that the Response was deficient for not being timely, but concluded to review the materials regardless.

Paragraph 4(a) of the ICANN UDRP Policy requires that the Complainant must prove each of the following three elements to obtain an order that a domain name should be cancelled or transferred: (1) the domain name registered by the Respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the Complainant has rights; (2) the Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and (3) the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.

In addressing the first element, the Panel explained:

The Panel finds that Complainant has failed to establish registered trademark rights or common law rights in the BSA mark. Specifically, Complainant’s use of the BSA mark for less than two years has been too short, and Complainant has not shown any evidence of the sort that is usually used to establish that a mark has acquired secondary meaning. In light of Respondent’s arguments, the Panel finds that Complainant has failed to establish common law rights in the BSA mark pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(a)(i)….Having found that Complainant has not satisfied Policy ¶ 4(a)(i) because it has failed to establish rights in the mark, the Panel declines to analyze the other two elements of the Policy.

The Panel was not finished though, since it then addressed the issue of Reverse Domain Name Hijacking.

The panel finds that Complainant has failed to present any evidence to support its claimed rights in the disputed domain name. It only provided an application for trademark registration which does not establish any enforceable rights under the UDRP. It did not offer any evidence to support a finding of common law rights in the disputed mark. Also, the Panel finds that Complainant knew or should have known that it was unable to prove that Respondent lacks rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name or that Respondent registered and is using the disputed domain name in bad faith. Based on the foregoing, the panel finds that reverse domain name hijacking has occurred.

In light of the following, the Panel DENIED Complainant’s request to transfer the domain. and made a finding of reverse domain name hijacking.

For anyone following UDRP cases, this one was highly anticipated. The case of Mercury Radio Arts, Inc. and Glenn Beck v. Isaac Eiland-Hall (WIPO D2009-1182, October 29, 2009) dealt with the domain www.glennbeckrapedandmurderedayounggirlin1990.com. (For all the case filings and opinion please go here.) If you don’t know anything about this case you should read the full decision to get an understanding of the UDRP process. It seems as though Mr. Beck got a taste of his own rhetoric today, but if you want to know more about him visit his web site at www.glennbeck.com. Our friend Marc Randazza has won another case with some very “eloquent” language in his pleadings and has provided many First Amendment proponents with a significant case for later use.

Essentially, the Panel found that the domain was confusingly similar to Mr. Beck’s trademark. The case turned on the issue of whether the domain was being used in a manner consistent with the First Amendment rights to publish satyrical content. The Panel believed that the disputed domain was a parody and should be afforded such protection. The Panel explained:

It can be and has been argued by Complainant that the disputed domain name should be assessed “standing alone” because at least some Internet viewers will only have that first impression (i.e., they will not click through).  However, this case involves a form of speech arguably strongly protected under the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.  This Panel is very reluctant to reject Respondent’s claim of legitimate noncommercial and fair use on the distinction between viewing of the disputed domain name itself and clicking through to Respondent’s website.  On the same basis by which the Panel has determined the disputed domain name is confusingly similar to Complainant’s trademark – that is, Internet users viewing the disputed domain name will be curious and motivated to visit the website – the Panel also considers that Respondent’s speech should be assessed as a whole, both by reference to the disputed domain name and the content of Respondent’s website (i.e., on the assumption the preponderance of Internet users will indeed click through).

The Panel did not address any issues of bad faith since they found that there was legitimate rights involved. The Panel stated “The Panel notes, however, that the combination of political speech engaged in by Respondent and the substantial lack of commercial intent makes it unlikely to this Panel that Complainant would have succeeded in demonstrating bad faith registration and use.”
A large tip of the hat goes out to Mr. Randazza for a great win.

Update: The Respondent pulled a fast one on Mr. Beck and relinquished the domain. See his letter to Beck (here)

In the recent domain name decision of National Association of Competitive Soccer Clubs v. Bruce Binler (WIPO, D2009-0957, September 7, 2009), a single member panel was faced with a dispute over the domain www.usclubsoccer.net. Complainant is a non-for profit organization responsible for putting together soccer clubs, leagues and tournaments across the U.S. Complainant maintains a web site at www.usclubsoccer.org and has a servicemark registration for US CLUB SOCCER. Respondent registered the domain in 2007 and failed to provide a response to the Complaint.

Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy sets forth three elements that must be established by a complainant to merit a finding that a respondent has engaged in abusive domain name registration and use, and to obtain relief. These elements are that: (i) respondent’s domain name is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the complainant has rights; and (ii) respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and (iii) respondent’s domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.

Some of the facts presented included that Respondent used the domain in connection with promoting soccer events sanctioned by Complainant in 2006 and 2007.These facts may have been relevant in the Panel’s findings, however, the Panel did not make it passed the first element.

The Panel found that Complainant did not establish sufficient rights in the mark US CLUB SOCCER. The Panel noted that Complainant’s citation to a federal registration failed to inform the Panel that it was actually on the Supplemental Register.

Complainant does not enjoy a presumption of service mark rights based on registration of US CLUB SOCCER on the Supplemental Register of the USPTO. Complainant does not enjoy any presumption of rights based on the submission of a recent application for registration of the same term on the Principal Register of the USPTO.

Although Complainant has recently applied again to the USPTO for the same mark seeking registration on the Principal Register. Therefore, the Panel noted that Complainant must show that it had sufficient common law rights. The Panel was concerned that the USPTO rejected the original application for being primarily geographically descriptive with terms that are generic or merely descriptive. The Panel took some liberties in doing some market reserach and made the following observations:

Critically however, Complainant did not address the question whether the terms are commonly descriptive or generic. In the interests of fairness, the Panel performed Google and Bing searches for CLUB SOCCER together. Those searches returned many millions of “hits”. While Complainant’s organization was listed first in non-advertising rank, there was a substantial number of references to organizations, news reports, domain names and other listings that include “club soccer” as a descriptive term. The Panel does not consider this search to be ultimately determinative on the question whether Complainant might establish rights in US CLUB SOCCER as a service mark, but it was sufficient to persuade the Panel that Complainant has not here carried its burden of demonstrating that the terms are more than commonly descriptive or generic, given that the USPTO previously decided to that effect.

In light of these findings the Panel found as follows:

The rejection by the USPTO of Complainant’s application for registration on the Principal Register and Complainant’s conversion of that application to the Supplemental Register implies that its alleged service mark is not distinctive. The grounds of rejection by the USPTO expressly related to characteristics that may be understood to preclude the establishment of secondary meaning (i.e., primarily geographically descriptive term, generic-ness or mere description).

The Panel found that Complainant failed to establish the first element and thus did not address the other two elements. The Panel ordered the request for transfer be DENIED.

In the recent domain name dispute, Spinsix Strategic Marketing Design, LLC v. RareNames, WebReg FA1273907 (Nat. Arb. Forum, September 3, 2009), a single member Panel was faced with a dispute over the domain www.lincs.com. Complainant appears to be an marketing firm, which sells computer related online marketing tools. Complainant maintains a web site at www.spinsix.com. Complainant owns a trademark registration for the mark LINCS. Respondent appears to be a domainer and registered the disputed domain in September 2003.

Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy requires that the Complainant must prove each of the following three elements to obtain an order that a domain name should be cancelled or transferred: (1) the domain name registered by the Respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the Complainant has rights; (2) the Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and (3) the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.

In addressing the first element, the Panel found that Complainant had established rights to the mark LINCS through its trademark registration. However, the Panel noted Complainant did not provide sufficient evidence of common law rights dating back to the first use date of January 2004. The Panel recognized that Respondent argued that the disputed domain registration date predated the first use allegations from Complainant, but declined to review the information for this element. The Panel found this element satisfied by Complainant.

Moving to the second element, the Panel found that Complainant failed to establish a prima facie case under the Policy. The Panel noted:

Respondent has offered convincing proof that it is in the business of registering generic domain names and displaying advertising that relates to the generic nature of the terms in the domain names. Respondent asserts that engaging in the sale of generic domain names is a legitimate business.  The Panel finds that Respondent has used the disputed domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c)(i)….Respondent also argues that the term in the <lincs.com> domain name is generic and of common use and therefore, Complainant does not have an exclusive monopoly on the term on the Internet. Respondent has offered convincing evidence that the contested domain name is comprised of a common term, such that the Panel finds that Respondent has established rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii).

The Panel then simply stated that the disputed domain was registered before Complainant’s first use of the mark, and then concluded that section finding Respondent had rights or legitimate interests in the domain.

The Panel declined to review the bad faith element in light of this finding and instead moved to Respondent request for a finding of Reverse Domain Name Hijacking. The Panel repeated some of Respondent’s arguments, but did not provide much of its own analysis. Respondent argued:

Complainant has attempted to engage in reverse domain name hijacking by filing the instant UDRP case, with the knowledge both that Respondent had rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name, and that Respondent could not have registered  the disputed domain name in bad faith, because its registration of September 01, 2003, pre-dated Complainant’s asserted common law usage of the mark in January of 2004.

In light of these arguments, the Panel found that Complainant engaged in reverse domain name hijacking and DENIED Complainant’s request for transfer.